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SUMMARY 
Many intra-firm transactions are non-market transactions and therefore lack a 
market determined price. A transfer price is the price assigned to such non-
market intra-firm transfers. Transfer prices are especially important for 
multinational corporations, since a parent company typically has subsidiaries 
or branches in other countries and transfers are often made between the 
component parts of the multinational. 
As the world has become more internationally dependent, these transactions 
and the associated transfer prices have come under increased scrutiny. The 
fear often expressed by governments is that a multinational corporation may 
manipulate transfer prices in order to transfer profits from one country to 
another, and thereby affect various government policies. Most notably, 
transfer prices can affect the tax revenues of both the home and host country. 
A general international consensus is that the appropriate transfer price is the 
'arm's length' price. This is the price that would be charged by two unrelated 
parties. However, it is often difficult to find such a comparable transaction. 
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The term transfer pricing describes the process by which entities set the 
prices at which they transfer goods or services between each other. 
The transfer prices adopted by a multinational have a direct bearing on the 
proportional profit it derives in each country in which it operates. If a non-
market value (inadequate or excessive consideration) is paid for the transfer 
of goods or services between the members of a multinational, the income 
calculated for each of those members will be inconsistent with their relative 
economic contributions. This distortion will impact on the tax revenues of the 
relevant tax jurisdictions in which they operate. 
For example, if a member of a multinational sells to a connected person 
resident in a specific country at a price which exceeds the market price, the 
profit which the multinational earns in that country is reduced. Similarly if the 
member of a multinational sells to a connected person resident in a country at 
a reduced price the profit the multinational earns in that country is increased. 
Since South Africa's re-emergence in the international market, there has been 
a marked expansion of international trade and commerce, with wide-ranging 
changes in volume and complexity. An increasing proportion of this 
international activity is carried on between members of multinationals. As the 
globalisation of business activity continues to accelerate, protecting the South 
African tax base is vital to South Africa's wealth and development. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
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Exchange controls have historically provided some protection against the 
more significant manipulation of transfer prices to transfer profits to lower tax 
jurisdictions. 
In anticipation of the relaxation of exchange controls and the envisaged 
adverse effect on the South African tax base section 31 of the Income Tax Act 
was introduced into the Act in 1955. 
Section 31 enables the Commissioner to adjust the consideration in respect of 
a supply or acquisition of goods or services in terms of an international 
agreement between connected persons. The Commissioner may adjust the 
consideration, for tax purposes, if the actual price is either less or greater than 
the price that would have been set if the supply or acquisition of goods or 
services had occurred between independent parties on an arm's length basis. 
The Commissioner may use the amount so determined, in the determination 
of the taxable income of either of the parties to the transaction. 
The section therefore, provides a mechanism by which the Commissioner 
adopts the internationally accepted "arm's length principle" for taxation 
purposes as the basis for ensuring that the South African fiscus receives its 
fair share of tax. This is achieved by adjusting the consideration in the 
determination of taxable income based on the conditions which would have 
existed between unconnected persons under comparable circumstances. 
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Chapter Two 
2. Section 31 of the Act 
Sections 31 were introduced into the Act with effect from 19 July 1995 to 
counter transfer pricing practices which may have adverse tax implications 
for the South African fiscus. This section consists of a combination of 
transfer pricing and thin capitalisation provisions. The measures to 
combat transfer pricing schemes are in essence contained in section 31 
(1) and (2). The provisions of section 31 (3) are more specifically aimed at 
countering thin capitalisation schemes. 
Section 31 (1) defines the terms used in this section. Section 31 (2) 
empowers the Commissioner to adjust the consideration (for the purposes 
of the Act and the calculation of taxable income) in respect of international 
agreements to reflect an arm's length price for the goods or services 
supplied in terms of that international agreement. 
The Commissioner may exercise his discretion in the following 
circumstance in relation to cross border transactions: 
• Where the acquirer of the goods or services is a connected person in 
relation to the supplier of those goods or services (including the supply 
of goods and services to or by a permanent establishment which either 
such acquirer or supplier has in South Africa or which either such 
acquirer or supplier has outside South Africa); and 
• The goods or services are supplied at a price other (greater or less) 
than the arm's length price. 
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Although the Act grants the Commissioner the power to adjust the 
consideration in respect of a transaction, the reality is that numerous 
transactions in respect of the same goods or services are entered into 
between the connected persons. 
In practice the Commissioner will exercise his discretion in respect of all 
transactions entered into in respect of a product or service during any period. 
Such period could be a year or number of years of assessment. 
In terms of sections 3 (4) of the Act, the Commissioner's decision is subject to 
objection and appeal. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
Chapter Three 
3. Tax Treaties 
Article 7 of the OECD "Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital" 
provides inter alia for the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment of 
an enterprise. Furthermore, Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
stipulates that the arm's length principle must be applied to commercial and 
financial relations between associated companies residing in the contracting 
states. These principles are embodied in each of South Africa's tax treaties. 
Tax treaties cannot impose tax liability; they merely allocate existing tax 
liabilities between countries. 
The "business profits" and "associated enterprises" articles in the tax treaties 
do not indicate priorities as to the methods to be used to determine the 
attribution of profits or an arm's length price. Therefore, the Commissioner 
hold the view that the treaties do not restrict or limit the application of 
Section31 of the Act, regardless of the method selected to determine an arm's 
length consideration. The Commissioner also takes the view that no 
inconsistency exists between domestic law and the tax treaties, as both 
embody the arm's length principle. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides that a 
contracting state must make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of tax it 
levies on profits, if the other contracting state has made an adjustment to the 
profits of a related enterprise. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
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Furthermore, the competent authorities of the contracting states may consult 
each other over the transfer pricing adjustments. Although South Africa's 
treaties generally incorporate such adjusting mechanisms, the wording of the 
relevant article in the treaties may not oblige South Africa to make a 
corresponding adjustment in all cases. 
Although the provisions of section 31 of the Act are applicable to persons, 
which are separate legal entities, the contents of SARS will also apply to 
determine the arm's length consideration for income tax purposes of cross-
border transactions conducted b y -
• A person with a connected person; 
• A person's head office with a branch of such person; or 
• A person's branch with another branch of such person, 
In the application of the tax treaties entered into by South Africa. 
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Chapter Four 
4. Commentary on the Implementation Procedure of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise. 
Preface 
1. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) 
are recommendations addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises. They provide voluntary principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws. The 
Guidelines aim to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in 
harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual 
confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they 
operate, to help improve the foreign investment climate and to enhance 
the contribution to sustain- able development made by multinational 
enterprises. The Guidelines are part of the OECD Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises the other 
elements of which relate to national treatment, conflicting requirements 
on enterprises, and international investment incentives and 
disincentives. 
2. International business has experienced far-reaching structural change 
and the Guidelines themselves have evolved to reflect these changes. 
With the rise of service and knowledge-intensive industries, service 
and technology enterprises have entered the international marketplace. 
Source date accessed 20 October 2004 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
Available from: http://www.oecd.org 
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Large enterprises still account for a major share of international 
investment, and there is a trend toward large-scale international 
mergers. At the same time, foreign investment by small and medium-
sized enterprises has also increased and these enterprises now play a 
significant role on the international scene. 
Multinational enterprises, like their domestic counterparts, have 
evolved to encompass a broader range of business arrangements and 
organizational forms. Strategic alliances and closer relations with 
suppliers and contractors tend to blur the boundaries of the enterprise. 
The rapid evolution in the structure of multinational enterprises is also 
reflected in their operations in the developing world, where foreign 
direct investment has grown rapidly. In developing countries, 
multinational enterprises have diversified beyond primary production 
and extractive industries into manufacturing, assembly, domestic 
market development and services. 
The activities of multinational enterprises, through international trade 
and investment, have strengthened and deepened the ties that join 
OECD economies to each other and to the rest of the world. These 
activities bring substantial benefits to home and host countries. These 
benefits accrue when multinational enterprises supply the products and 
services that consumers want to buy at competitive prices and when 
they provide fair returns to suppliers of capital. Their trade and 
investment activities contribute to the efficient use of capital, 
technology and human and natural resources. They facilitate the 
transfer of technology among the regions of the world and the 
development of technologies that reflect local conditions. Through both 
formal training and on-the-job learning enterprises also promote the 
development of human capital in host countries. 
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The nature, scope and speed of economic changes have presented 
new strategic challenges for enterprises and their stakeholders. 
Multinational enterprises have the opportunity to implement best 
practice polices for sustainable development that seek to ensure 
coherence between social, economic and environmental objectives. 
The ability of multinational enterprises to promote sustainable 
development is greatly enhanced when trade and investment are 
conducted in a context of open, competitive and appropriately 
regulated markets. 
Many multinational enterprises have demonstrated that respect for high 
standards of business conduct can enhance growth. Today's 
competitive forces are intense and multinational enterprises face a 
variety of legal, social and regulatory settings. In this context, some 
enterprises may be tempted to neglect appropriate standards and 
principles of conduct in an attempt to gain undue competitive 
advantage. Such practices by the few may call into question the 
reputation of the many and may give rise to public concerns. 
Many enterprises have responded to these public concerns by 
developing internal programmes, guidance and management systems 
that underpin their commitment to good corporate citizenship, good 
practices and good business and employee conduct. Some of them 
have called upon consulting, auditing and certification services, 
contributing to the accumulation of expertise in these areas. These 
efforts have also promoted social dialogue on what constitutes good 
business conduct. The Guidelines clarify the shared expectations for 
business conduct of the governments adhering to them and provide a 
point of reference for enterprises. Thus, the Guidelines both 
complement and reinforce private efforts to define and implement 
responsible business conduct. 
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Governments are co-operating with each other and with other actors to 
strengthen the international legal and policy framework in which 
business is conducted. The post-war period has seen the development 
of this framework, starting, with the adoption in 1948 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
Recent instruments include the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and Agenda 21 and the Copenhagen Declaration for 
Social Development. 
The OECD has also been contributing to the international policy 
framework. Recent developments include the adoption of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and of the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
in the Context of Electronic Commerce, and ongoing work on the 
OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations. 
The common aim of the governments adhering to the Guidelines is to 
encourage the positive contributions that multinational enterprises can 
make to economic, environmental and social progress and to minimize 
the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise. In 
working towards this goal, governments find themselves in partnership 
with the many businesses, trade unions and other non-governmental 
organizations that are working in their own ways toward the same end. 
Governments can help by providing effective domestic policy 
frameworks that include stable macroeconomic policy, non-
discriminatory treatment of firms, appropriate regulation and prudential 
supervision, an impartial system of courts and law enforcement and 
efficient and honest public administration. Governments can also help 
by maintaining and promoting appropriate standards and policies in 
support of sustainable development and by engaging in ongoing 
reforms to ensure that public sector activity is efficient and effective. 
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Governments adhering to the Guidelines are committed to continual 
improvement of both domestic and international policies with a view to 
improving the welfare and living standards of all people. 
Concepts and Principles 
1. The Guidelines is recommendations jointly addressed by governments 
to multi national enterprises. They provide principles and standards of 
good practice consistent with applicable laws. Observance of the 
Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not legally enforceable. 
2. Since the operations of multinational enterprises extend throughout the 
world, international co-operation in this field should extend to all 
countries. Governments adhering to the Guidelines encourage the 
enterprises operating on their territories to observe the Guidelines 
wherever they operate, while taking into account the particular 
circumstances of each host country. 
3. A precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the 
purposes of the Guidelines. These usually comprise companies or 
other entities established in more than one country and so linked that 
they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one or 
more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence 
over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the 
enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to 
another. Ownership may be private, state or mixed. The Guidelines 
are addressed to all the entities within the multinational enterprise 
(parent companies and/or local entities). According to the actual 
distribution of responsibilities among them, the different entities are 
expected to co-operate and to assist one another to facilitate 
observance of the Guidelines. 
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4. The Guidelines are not aimed at introducing differences of treatment 
between multinational and domestic enterprises; they reflect good 
practice for all. Accordingly, multinational and domestic enterprises are 
subject to the same expectations in respect of their conduct wherever 
the Guidelines are relevant to both. 
5. Governments wish to encourage the widest possible observance of the 
Guidelines. While it is acknowledged that small and medium-sized 
enterprises may not have the same capacities as larger enterprises, 
governments adhering to the Guidelines nevertheless encourage them 
to observe the Guidelines recommendations to the fullest extent 
possible. 
6. Governments adhering to the Guidelines should not use them for 
protectionist purposes nor use them in a way that calls into question 
the comparative advantage of any country where multinational 
enterprises invest. 
7. Governments have the right to prescribe the conditions under which 
multinational enterprises operate within their jurisdictions, subject to 
international law. The entities of a multinational enterprise located in 
various countries are subject to the laws applicable in these countries. 
When multinational enterprises are subject to conflicting requirements 
by adhering countries, the governments concerned will co-operate in 
good faith with a view to resolving problems that may arise. 
8. Governments adhering to the Guidelines set them forth with the 
understanding that they will fulfill their responsibilities to treat 
enterprises equitably and in accordance with international law and with 
their contractual obligations. 
12 
9. The use of appropriate international dispute settlement mechanisms, 
including arbitration, is encouraged as a means of facilitating the 
resolution of legal problems arising between enterprises and host 
country governments. 
10. Governments adhering to the Guidelines will promote them and 
encourage their' use. They will establish National Contact Points that 
promote the Guidelines and act as a forum for discussion of all matters 
relating to the Guidelines. 
The adhering Governments will also participate in appropriate review 
and consultation procedures to address issues concerning 
interpretation of the Guidelines in a changing world. 
General Policies 
Enterprises should take fully into account established policies in the 
countries in which they operate, and consider the views of other 
stakeholders. In this regard, enterprises should: 
1. Contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a view 
to achieving sustainable development. 
2. Respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent 
with the host government's international obligations and commitments. 
3. Encourage local capacity building through close co-operation with the 
local community, including business interests, as well as developing 
the enterprise's activities in domestic and foreign markets, consistent 
with the need for sound commercial practice. 
4. Encourage human capital formation, in particular by creating 
employment opportunities and facilitating training opportunities for 
employees. 
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5. Refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the 
statutory or regulatory framework related to environmental, health, 
safety, labour, taxation, financial incentives, or other issues. 
6. Support and uphold good corporate governance principles and develop 
and apply good corporate governance practices. 
7. Develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management 
systems that foster a relationship of confidence and mutual trust 
between enterprises and the societies in which they operate. 
8. Promote employee awareness of, and compliance with, company 
policies through appropriate dissemination of these policies, including 
through training programmes. 
9. Refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary action against employees 
who make bona fide reports to management or, as appropriate, to the 
competent public authorities, on practices that contravene the law, the 
Guidelines or the enterprise's policies. 
10. Encourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers 
and sub- contractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct 
compatible with the Guidelines. 
11. Abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities. 
Disclosure 
1. Enterprises should ensure that timely, regular, reliable and relevant 
information is disclosed regarding their activities, structure, financial 
situation and performance. This information should be disclosed for 
the enterprise as whole and, where appropriate, along business lines 
or geographic areas. 
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Disclosure policies of enterprises should be tailored to the nature, size 
and location of the enterprise, with due regard taken of costs, business 
confidentiality and other competitive concerns. 
2. Enterprises should apply high quality standards for disclosure, 
accounting, and audit. Enterprises are also encouraged to apply high 
quality standards for non- financial information including environmental 
and social reporting where they exist. 
The standards or policies under which both financial and non-financial 
information are compiled and published should be reported. 
3. Enterprises should disclose basic information showing their name, 
location, and structure, the name, address and telephone number of 
the parent enterprise and its main affiliates, its percentage ownership, 
direct and indirect in these affiliates, including shareholdings between 
them. 
4. Enterprises should also disclose material information on: 
a) The financial and operating results of the company. 
b) Company objectives. 
c) Major share ownership and voting right. 
d) Members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration. 
e) Material foreseeable risk factors. 
f) Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
g) Governance structures and policies. 
5. Enterprises are encouraged to communicate additional information that 
could include: 
a) Value statements or statements of business conduct intended for 
public disclosure including information on the social, ethical and 
environmental policies of the enterprise and other codes of conduct to 
which the company subscribes. In addition, the date of adoption, the 
countries and entities to which such statements apply and its 
performance in relation to these statements may be communicated. 
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b) Information on systems for managing risks and complying with laws, 
and on statements or codes of business conduct. 
c) Information on relationships with employees and other stakeholders 
Employment and Industrial Relations 
Enterprises should, within the framework of applicable law, regulations 
and prevailing labour relations and employment practices: 
1. a) Respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade 
unions and other bona fide representatives of employees, and engage 
in constructive negotiations, either individually or through employers' 
associations, with such representatives with a view to reaching 
agreements on employment conditions; 
b) Contribute to the effective abolition of child labour. 
c) Contribute to the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour. 
d) Not discriminate against their employees with respect to 
employment or occupation on such grounds as race, colour, sex, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, unless 
selectivity concerning employee characteristics furthers established 
governmental policies which specifically promote greater equality of 
employment opportunity or relates to the inherent requirements of a 
job. 
2. a) Provide facilities to employee representatives as may be necessary 
to assist in the development of effective collective agreements. 
b) Provide information to employee representatives which are needed 
for meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment. 
c) Promote consultation and co-operation between employers and 
employees and their representatives on matters of mutual concern. 
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3. Provide information to employees and their representatives, which 
enables them to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the 
entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole. 
4. a) Observe standards of employment and industrial relations not less 
favorable than those observed by comparable employers in the host 
country. 
b) Take adequate steps to ensure occupational health and safety in 
their operations. 
5. In their operations, to the greatest extent practicable, employ local 
personnel and provide training with a view to improving skill levels, in 
co-operation with employee representatives and, where appropriate, 
relevant governmental authorities. 
6. In considering changes in their operations which would have major 
effects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the case 
of the closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or dismissals, 
provide reasonable notice of such changes to representatives of their 
employees, and, where appropriate, to the relevant governmental 
authorities, and co-operate with the employee representatives and 
appropriate governmental authorities so as to mitigate to the maximum 
extent practicable adverse effects. In light of the specific 
circumstances of each case, it would be appropriate if management 
were able to give such notice prior to the final decision being taken. 
Other means may also be employed to provide meaningful co-
operation to mitigate the effects of such decisions. 
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7. In the context of bona fide negotiations with representatives of 
employees on conditions of employment, or while employees are 
exercising a right to organize, not threaten to transfer the whole or part 
of an operating unit from the country concerned nor transfer employees 
from the enterprises' component entities in other countries in order to 
influence unfairly those negotiations or to hinder the exercise of a right 
to organize. 
8. Enable authorized representatives of their employees to negotiate on 
collective bargaining or labour-management relations issues and allow 
the parties to consult on matters of mutual concern with 
representatives of management who are authorized to take decisions 
on these matters. 
Environment 
Enterprises should within the framework of laws, regulations and 
administrative practices in the countries in which they operate, and in 
consideration of relevant international agreements, principles, 
objectives, and standards take due account of the need to protect the 
environment, public health and safety, and generally to conduct their 
activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable 
development. In particular, enterprises should: 
1. Establish and maintain a system of environmental management 
appropriate to the enterprise, including: 
a) Collection and evaluation of adequate and timely information 
regarding the environmental, health, and safety impacts of their 
activities. 
b) Establishment of measurable objectives and, where appropriate, 
targets for improved environmental performance, including periodically 
reviewing the continuing relevance of these objectives; and 
c) Regular monitoring and verification of progress toward 
environmental, health and safety objectives or targets. 
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2. Taking into account concerns about cost, business confidentiality, and 
the protection of intellectual property rights: 
a) Provide the public and employees with adequate and timely 
information on the potential environment, health and safety impacts of 
the activities of the enterprise, which could include reporting on 
progress in improving environmental performance; and 
b) Engage in adequate and timely communication and consultation 
with the communities directly affected by the environmental, health and 
safety policies of the enterprise and by their implementation. 
3. Assess, and address in decision-making, the foreseeable 
environmental, health and safety-related impacts associated with the 
processes, goods and services of the enterprise over their full life 
cycle. Where these proposed activities may have significant 
environmental, health or safety impacts, and where they are subject to 
a decision of a competent authority, prepare an appropriate 
environmental impact assessment. 
4. Consistent with the scientific and technical understanding of the risks, 
where there are threats of serious damage to the environment, taking 
also into account human health and safety, not use the lack of full 
scientific certainty as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent or minimize such damage. 
5. Maintain contingency plans for preventing, mitigating, and controlling 
serious environmental and health damage from their operations, 
including accidents and emergencies; and mechanisms for immediate 
reporting to the competent authorities. 
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6. Continually seek to improve corporate environmental performance, by 
encouraging where appropriate, such activities as: 
a) Adoption of technologies and operating procedures in all parts of 
the enterprise that reflect standards concerning environmental 
performance in the best performing part of the enterprise. 
b) Development and provision of products or services that have no 
undue environmental impacts; are safe in their intended use; are 
efficient in their consumption of energy and natural resources; can be 
re-used, recycled, or disposed of safely. 
c) Promoting higher levels of awareness among customers of the 
environmental implications of using the products and services of the 
enterprise; and 
d) Research on ways of improving the environmental performance of 
the enterprise over the longer term. 
7. Provide adequate education and training to employees in 
environmental health and safety matters including the handling of 
hazardous materials and the prevention of environmental accidents as 
well as more general environmental man- agreement areas, such as 
environmental impact assessment procedures, public relations and 
environmental technologies. 
8. Contribute to the development of environmentally meaningful and 
economically efficient public policy for example by means of 
partnerships or initiatives that will enhance environmental awareness 
and protection. 
Combating Bribery 
Enterprises should not directly or indirectly offer, promise, give, or 
demand a bribe or other undue advantage to obtain or retain business 
or other improper advantage. Nor should enterprises be solicited or 
expected to render a bribe or other undue advantage. 
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In particular, enterprises should: 
1. Not offer, nor give in to demands, to pay public officials or the 
employees of business partners any portion of a contract payment. 
They should not use sub-contracts, purchase orders or consulting 
agreements as means of channeling payments to public officials, to 
employees of business partners or to their relatives or business 
associates. 
2. Ensure that remuneration of agents is appropriate and for legitimate 
services only. Where relevant, a list of agents employed in connection 
with transactions with public bodies and state-owned enterprises 
should be kept and made available to competent authorities. 
3. Enhance the transparency of their activities in the fight against bribery 
and extortion. 
Measures could include making public commitments against bribery 
and extortion and disclosing the management systems the company 
has adopted in order to honour these commitments. The enterprise 
should also foster openness and dialogue with the public so as to 
promote its awareness of and co-operation with the fight against 
bribery and extortion. 
4. Promote employee awareness of and compliance with company 
policies against bribery and extortion through appropriate 
dissemination of these policies and through training programmes and 
disciplinary procedures. 
5. Adopt management control systems that discourage bribery and 
corrupt practices, and adopt financial and tax accounting and auditing 
practices that prevent the establishment of "off the books" or secret 
accounts or the creation of documents which do not properly and fairly 
record the transactions to which they relate. 
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6. Not make illegal contributions to candidates for public office or to 
political parties or to other political organizations. Contributions should 
fully comply with public disclosure requirements and should be 
reported to senior management. 
Consumer Interests 
When dealing with consumers, enterprises should act in accordance 
with fair business, marketing and advertising practices and should take 
all reasonable steps to ensure the safety and quality of the goods or 
services they provide. 
In particular, they should: 
1. Ensure that the goods or services they provide meet all agreed or 
legally required standards for consumer health and safety, including 
health warnings and product safety and information labels. 
2. As appropriate to the goods or services, provide accurate and clear 
information regarding their content, safe use, maintenance, storage, 
and disposal sufficient to enable consumers to make informed 
decisions. 
3. Provide transparent and effective procedures that address consumer 
complaints and contribute to fair and timely resolution of consumer 
disputes without undue cost or burden. 
4. Not make representations or omissions, nor engage in any other 
practices, that are deceptive, misleading, fraudulent, or unfair. 
5. Respect consumer privacy and provide protection for personal data. 
6. Co-operate fully and in a transparent manner with public authorities in 
the prevention or removal of serious threats to public health and safety 
deriving from the consumption or use of their products. 
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Science and Technology 
Enterprises should: 
1. Endeavour to ensure that their activities are compatible with the 
science and technology (S&T) policies and plans of the countries in 
which they operate and as appropriate contribute to the development of 
local and national innovative capacity, political parties or to other 
political organizations. Contributions should fully comply with public 
disclosure requirements and should be reported to senior 
management. 
2. Adopt, where practicable in the course of their business activities, 
practices that permit the transfer and rapid diffusion of technologies 
and know-how, with due regard to the protection of intellectual property 
rights. 
3. When appropriate, perform science and technology development work 
in host countries to address local market needs, as well as employ host 
country personnel in an S&T capacity and encourage their training, 
taking into account commercial needs. 
4. When granting licenses for the use of intellectual property rights or 
when otherwise transferring technology, do so on reasonable terms 
and conditions and in a manner that contributes to the long term 
development prospects of the host country. 
5. Where relevant to commercial objectives, develop ties with local 
universities, public research institutions, and participate in co-operative 
research projects with local industry or industry associations. 
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Competition 
Enterprises should, within the framework of applicable laws and 
regulations, conduct their activities in a competitive manner. In 
particular, enterprises should: 
1. Refrain from entering into or carrying out anti-competitive agreements 
among competitors: 
a) To fix prices. 
b) To make rigged bids (collusive tenders). 
c) To establish output restrictions or quotas; or 
d) To share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, 
territories or lines of commerce. 
2. Conduct all of their activities in a manner consistent with all applicable 
competition laws, taking into account the applicability of the competition 
laws of jurisdictions whose economies would be likely to be harmed by 
anti-competitive activity on their part. 
3. Co-operate with the competition authorities of such jurisdictions by, 
among other things and subject to applicable law and appropriate 
safeguards, providing as prompt and complete responses as 
practicable to requests for information. 
4. Promote employee awareness of the importance of compliance with all 
applicable competition laws and policies. 
Taxation 
It is important that enterprises contribute to the public finances of host 
countries by making timely payment of their tax liabilities. In particular, 
enterprises should comply with the tax laws and regulations in all 
countries in which they operate and should exert every effort to act in 
accordance with both the letter and spirit of those laws and regulations. 
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This would include such measures as providing to the relevant 
authorities the information necessary for the correct determination of 
taxes to be assessed in connection with their operations and 
conforming transfer pricing practices to the arm's length principle. 
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Chapter Five 
5. The Arm's Length Principle 
The first and overriding principle is that transactions between connected 
persons are to be conducted at arm's length. This simply means that the 
transaction should have the substantive financial characteristics of a 
transaction between independent parties, where each party will strive to get 
the utmost possible benefit from the transaction. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention deals with the 
arm's length principle as follows: 
"[When] conditions are made or imposed between...two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from 
those which would have been made between independent enterprises, 
then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one 
of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly." 
• The problem to be resolved is how a multinational should determine 
what price would have arisen if transactions between its members were 
subject to market forces. The solution advanced by the arm's length 
principle is that a comparable transaction between independent parties 
(an uncontrolled transaction) should be used as a benchmark against 
which to appraise the multinational's prices (the controlled transaction). 
Any difference between the two transactions can then be identified and 
adjusted. An arm's length price that will reflect the economic 
contributions made by the parties to the transaction can be determined 
for the controlled transaction. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
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• South Africa has adopted the arm's length principle, which is the 
international norm. 
The Commissioner is of the opinion that application of this 
internationally accepted principle will minimise the potential for double 
taxation. 
• Other than tax considerations, factors such as governmental 
regulations (for example price or exchange controls) may distort the 
prices charged between connected persons. These factors are 
recognised by the OECD Guidelines and the Commissioner. This 
Practice Note intends to provide broad guidelines about the business 
and economic concepts which serve to indicate what information, data 
and other evidence would support a contention that a transaction has 
occurred at arm's length. 
• The determination of an arm's length consideration is not an exact 
science but requires judgement on the part of both the taxpayer and 
the Commissioner. Accordingly, taxpayers and the Commissioner need 
to approach each case, having due regard for the unique business and 
market realities applicable to each individual case. 
• An arm's length price does not necessarily constitute a single price, but 
a range of prices and the facts of each case will determine where, 
within that range, a specific arm's length price will lie 
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New Zealand's approach to Arm's length principle 
Introduction 
Coverage of guidelines 
These guidelines on New Zealand's transfer pricing rules aim to provide 
taxpayers with an appreciation of what they will need to do if they are to 
demonstrate to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue that they have compiled 
with the arm's length principle in section GD13. 
Specifically, the guidelines consider: 
• The rationale behind New Zealand's adoption of the arm's length 
principle 
• The conceptual framework on which application of the acceptable 
transfer pricing methods is based 
• The general principles of comparability (including a discussion on 
functional analysis) which forms the foundation of transfer pricing 
analysis 
• The factors taxpayers should consider in determining the extent to 
which documentation should be prepared and maintained in support of 
their determination of the arm's length price 
• The treatment of intangible property 
• The treatment of intra-group services, such as management fees, and 
• Cost contribution arrangements (CCAs). 
Source accessed 17 September 
New Zealand Transfer Pricing Explored 
Available from: http://www.taxpolicy.ird.qovt.nz 
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The material in these guidelines was released for consultation in draft form 
in two parts. Part 1, released in October 1997, provided a general 
overview of the framework within which transfer pricing operates, including 
a discussion on documentation. Part 2, released in January 2000, dealt 
with intangible property, intra-group services, and CCAs. 
No changes have been made to Part 2 following consultation, other than to 
update cross-references. 
Some changes have been made to Part 1, but these do not affect substantive 
issues. A summary of the changes is set out in a short chapter at the end of 
these guidelines. 
Relationship to OECD guidelines 
Tax Information Bulletin Vol 7, No 11 (March 1996) describe New Zealand's 
transfer pricing legislation enacted in December 1995. 
On page 1 of that publication, it was stated that until New Zealand's transfer 
pricing guidelines are issued, Inland Revenue will be following the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administration (referred to in these guidelines as the "OECD guidelines") in 
applying the transfer pricing rules. 
There is however, no valid reason why Inland Revenue should not follow the 
OECD guidelines entirely in administering New Zealand's transfer pricing 
rules. The consensus established between OECD member countries means 
that the OECD guidelines will, for example, be the relevant guidelines to 
consider if a transfer pricing issue is raised under New Zealand's double tax 
agreements. Inland Revenue also does not differ substantively from the 
OECD's view on any point. 
Inland Revenue, therefore, fully endorses the positions set out in chapters 1 to 
8 of the OECD guidelines and proposes to follow those positions in 
administering New Zealand's transfer pricing rules. 
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Consequently, New Zealand's guidelines should be read as supplementing 
the OECD guidelines, rather than superseding them. This applies for the 
domestic application of New Zealand's rules, as well as in relation to issues 
raised under New Zealand's double taxation agreements. 
The question might be asked, therefore, of why New Zealand has drafted its 
own guidelines. The answer is that by issuing guidelines with a practical 
focus, Inland Revenue hopes to explain transfer pricing in a way that is 
perhaps more accessible to taxpayers confronted by the issue than are the 
OECD guidelines. Further, it is expected that New Zealand guidelines will be 
able to offer pragmatic solutions to issues that are better suited to the New 
Zealand business environment. Finally, the OECD leaves issues such as 
documentation to the discretion of individual jurisdictions, so it is necessary 
for Inland Revenue to develop an appropriate view on the issue. 
These guidelines are cross-referenced to paragraphs in the OECD guidelines, 
when relevant. If more detail is required than is provided in these guidelines, 
reference should be made to the OECD guidelines. 
Inland Revenue's approach to New Zealand guidelines 
There are two possible approaches that might be taken in drafting transfer 
pricing guidelines. The first is to draft prescriptive guidelines that attempt to 
deal with every transfer pricing issue that may arise. In Inland Revenue's 
view, such an approach is ineffective. Establishing appropriate transfer prices 
for tax purposes involves the application of judgment, which will often depend 
on taxpayers individual circumstances. Prescriptive guidelines are, therefore, 
not considered to be a practicable option. 
The second approach is to provide guidance on the factors that should be 
considered in determining whether an amount constitutes an arm's length 
price and how these factors might affect a transfer pricing analysis. 
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This is the approach adopted in these guidelines, and it is hoped that the 
result will achieve the aim of providing a practical guide to transfer pricing 
issues and the application of the arm's length principle. 
Inland Revenue acknowledges that the guidelines cannot provide an 
exhaustive discussion of transfer pricing issues. Taxpayers may therefore 
wish to look to additional sources for advice on how to apply the arm's length 
principle. The OECD guidelines should obviously be the first point of 
reference, particularly as they will form the basis for resolving transfer pricing 
disputes under the mutual agreement articles of New Zealand's double tax 
agreement. However, on issues concerning the administration of New 
Zealand's transfer pricing rules on which New Zealand has discretion to 
establish an independent position, such as documentation, the New Zealand 
guidelines should be read as paramount. 
Two other significant references are the guidelines issues by the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO) and the United States' section 482 regulations. 
Both of these sources provide valuable background information on the 
application of the arm's length principle. Obviously aspects in those 
guidelines that have been drafted with only Australia or the United States in 
mind, such as the point within a range to which the relevant jurisdiction will 
seek to adjust taxpayers' transfer prices, will not be relevant in the New 
Zealand context. However, on issues such as the application of pricing 
methods and the principles of comparability and functional analysis, for which 
both jurisdictions follows the established international norm, there should be 
no inconsistency between the Australian and United States approaches, and 
that of New Zealand. 
Key messages 
A number of important messages are reiterated throughout these guidelines. 
Perhaps first and foremost, transfer pricing is not an exact science. These 
guidelines continually emphasize that transfer pricing is a matter of judgment. 
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("Judgment" is used here in the sense of establishing the extent to which a 
factor is significant in determining an arm's length price, as opposed to an 
intuitive feeling that a price is correct). This is the reason for preparing these 
guidelines as a practical guide, rather than as prescriptive rules for 
determining transfer prices. 
Second, the transfer pricing rules will be administered most efficiently if 
taxpayers and Inland Revenue co-operate in resolving transfer pricing issues. 
The final key message is that taxpayers know their business best, and this 
should influence how they respond to the transfer pricing rules. Taxpayers 
know how their prices are set and what the economic and commercial 
justifications are for the actions they take, and this knowledge can be used to 
develop a strong transfer pricing analysis. 
If taxpayers make conscientious efforts to establish transfer prices that 
comply with the arm's length principle, and prepare documentation to 
evidence that compliance, Inland Revenue is likely to determine prima facie 
that those transfer pricing practices represent a low tax risk, and the review of 
those practices is likely to be diminished accordingly. By contrast, taxpayers 
who give inadequate consideration to their transfer pricing practices are likely 
to receive closer attention from Inland Revenue. Documentation to evidence 
consistency, therefore, plays a key role in determining whether Inland 
Revenue is likely to review taxpayers' transfer pricing in greater detail. Inland 
Revenue considers it to be in taxpayers' best interests to prepare and 
maintain adequate documentation. 
Scope of guidelines and application of section FB2 to branches 
These guidelines apply only to the application of section GD 13 (as modified 
by section GC 1 where relevant). They therefore apply only to transactions 
between separate entities. 
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The guidelines do not apply to transactions within a single entity, such as 
between a parent company and its branch operation. Those transactions are 
subject instead to the apportionment rules in section FB2. 
Inland Revenue has received several comments expressing concern that no 
guidance has been issued to date on the application of section FB2 to 
branches. 
Section FB2 was intentionally drafted to parallel the wording contained in 
Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, and in particular that part of 
Article 7(2) that attributes to a permanent establishment: 
...the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and 
separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the 
same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the 
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment. 
The drafting of section FB2(1) follows closely that of the OECD, because of 
New Zealand's policy of following, in relation to branches, the position 
established by the OECD for permanent establishments. 
The OECD's current published position on the issue, which Inland Revenue 
follows, is set out in the loose-leaf version of the OECD's Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (November 1997), specifically, the: 
a. Commentary on Article 7 (Business Profits) in volume 1, and 
b. Report on the Attribution of Income to Permanent 
Establishments in volume 2 
The OECD is continuing to work on developing guidelines on the application 
of the arm's length principle to permanent establishments. It is not clear when 
this work might be expected to be completed, or whether it might entail a 
change of interpretation on how Article 7 applies. Whatever the outcome, 
Inland Revenue expects to continue following the position established by the 
OECD, once it is finalized and published. 
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Mechanisms to reduce transfer pricing disputes 
Two mechanisms that can reduce the incidence of transfer pricing disputes 
and about which Inland Revenue considers brief comment should be made 
are those of the Competent Authority procedure and advance pricing 
agreements (APAs). 
Competent Authority procedures 
New Zealand has a number of bilateral income tax treaties with other 
countries, One reason for signing such treaties is to eliminate the double 
taxation that often results from the allocation of tax revenues from 
international transactions. 
When a foreign tax administration has initiated or proposed a transfer pricing 
adjustment, taxpayers can be expected to seek assistance from the New 
Zealand Competent Authority, either to obtain corresponding adjustments or 
deductions in New Zealand, or to obtain assistance in presenting its case to 
the foreign tax administration. 
If a transfer pricing adjustment has been made by a foreign tax administration 
that results in double taxation, a taxpayer may request competent authority 
consideration under the Mutual Agreement Procedure Article in New 
Zealand's tax treaties. This could result in a corresponding adjustment being 
allowed in New Zealand, or the New Zealand Competent Authority taking the 
issue of appropriate arm's length pricing up with the foreign administration. 
Taxpayers should not, however, seek to make corresponding adjustments or 
deductions directly to their tax returns. Such an approach is inconsistent with 
New Zealand's tax law, which effectively requires the actual transaction price 
to be used for tax purposes unless the transfer pricing rules substitute an 
alternative price. The fact that a foreign tax administration has substituted an 
alternative price for their tax purposes does not change the transaction price 
to which New Zealand's rules apply. 
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Under the Mutual Agreement Article, an onus is placed on the Competent 
Authorities of the two countries to attempt to resolve the matter in a way that 
avoids double taxation. 
Advance pricing agreements (APAs) 
APAs are another mechanism that can help reduce transfer pricing disputes. 
An APA is defined, at paragraph 4.124 of the OECD Guidelines, to be: 
"an arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled 
transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables 
and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future 
events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for that transaction 
over a given period of time." 
The main benefit of an APA from a taxpayer's perspective will be that it can 
provide certainty of treatment - the taxpayer is provided with the assurance 
that the transfer prices they determine will be acceptable to Inland Revenue. 
Once an APA is in place, any Inland Revenue transfer pricing audit activity 
will, provided the taxpayer continues to comply with the terms and conditions 
of the APA, extend only to confirming that compliance. 
Inland Revenue has not established any formal processes for obtaining an 
APA, as each case may be different, depending on a taxpayer's specific facts 
and circumstances. 
Terminology 
In the guidelines, the term "multinational" is used to refer to any commonly 
owned group with members in more than one country. The term "members" 
refers to constituent parts of that multinational, each having a separate legal 
existence. 
The guidelines, also frequently refer to "controlled transactions" and 
"uncontrolled transactions". 
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A "controlled transaction" is one in which the ownership relationship between 
the parties is able to influence the transfer price set. In relation to section GD 
13, a controlled transaction will be any transaction between associated 
persons. However, it is possible that the term could have a wider meaning to 
the extent that section GC1 applies. 
An "uncontrolled transaction" is one that is conducted at arm's length between 
enterprises that are independent of each other. This could include, for 
example, transactions between two independent firms, or transactions at 
arm's length between a multinational and an independent firm. Uncontrolled 
transactions form the benchmark against which a multinational's transfer 
pricing is appraised in determining whether its prices are arm's length. 
Notice should also be taken of the term "related parties". Section GD 13 
applies only to transactions between associated persons. However, because 
section GC1 can extend the application of section GD13 to non-associated 
parties in certain circumstances, the guidelines use the term "related parties" 
in preference to "associated persons" to encompass the potential application 
of both section GD13 and section GC1. 
Future work 
The OECD is continuing to undertake work on specialist transfer pricing areas 
such as global trading and insurance. At this stage, Inland Revenue does not 
propose to issue its own guidelines in these areas. Instead, Inland Revenue 
is likely to endorse the OECD guidelines, once issued, in the administration of 
these areas in the form in which the OECD releases them. 
It is also unlikely that Inland Revenue will issue separate guidance on 
attributing income to branches. Although the draft guidelines suggested 
Inland Revenue would seek to issue guidance in this area also, there would 
seem little to be gained by replicating the analysis of the OECD once 
published, given that Inland Revenue is likely to endorse fully any position 
established by the OECD in this area. 
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Arm's length principle 
Key points 
• The transfer prices adopted by a multinational directly affect the 
amount of profit derived by that multinational in each country in 
which it operates. If a multinational adopts non-market values its 
transactions, the income calculated for each of its members will be 
inconsistent with their relative economic contributions. 
• The focus of New Zealand's transfer pricing rules is to ensure that 
the proper amount of income derived by a multinational is attributed 
to its New Zealand operations. 
• New Zealand's transfer pricing rules are based on the arm's length 
principle stated in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. 
• New Zealand has adopted the arm's length principle because it is 
considered the most reliable way to determine the amount of 
income properly attributable to a multinational's New Zealand 
operations and, because it represents the international norm, it 
should minimize the potential for double taxation. 
Introduction 
When independent enterprises deal with each other, market forces ordinarily 
determine the conditions for their commercial and financial relations. By 
contrast, when members of a multinational deal with each other, external 
market forces may not directly affect their commercial and financial relations 
in the same way. 
For example, a multinational may be more concerned with its overall 
profitability than it is with the allocation of those profits between its members. 
On the other hand, the multinational may well have set its transfer prices with 
a view to determining accurately the profit attributable to a local operation, 
perhaps for the purpose of measuring accurately the relative performance of 
its managers. 
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The upshot is that there are many factors that might drive a multinational's 
transfer pricing policies. However, these factors can conflict with the 
objectives of a host government. For this reason special rules have been 
adopted to determine transfer prices for tax purposes. 
New Zealand taxes all persons on their income sourced in New Zealand, 
which means exercising its jurisdiction to tax foreign-based multinationals on 
profits attributable to their New Zealand operations. These profits, in theory 
are expected to be commensurate with the economic contribution made 
including commercial risk borne) by those New Zealand operations. 
New Zealand's transfer pricing rules are intended to measure the amount of 
income and expenditure of a multinational properly attributable to its New 
Zealand operation. 
Importance of transfer prices to determination of tax base 
The transfer prices adopted by a multinational have a direct bearing on the 
proportional profit it derives in each country in which it operates. If a non-
market value (inadequate or excessive consideration) is paid for the transfer 
of goods, services, intangible property or loans between those members, the 
income calculated for each of those members will be inconsistent with their 
relative economic contributions. This distortion will flow through to the tax 
revenues of their host countries. 
For example, if a multinational sells to a controlled entity in a country at a high 
price (one that exceeds the market selling price), the profit it earns in that 
country is reduced. Similarly, if the multinational sells into a country at a low 
price, the profit it earns in that country is increased. 
The following example illustrates the effect of transfer prices on the profit 
allocation between firms in two countries. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
neither firm incurs any distribution costs or other expenses (other than the 
cost of purchasing the product). 
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Consider a multinational that has a manufacturing operation in New Zealand 
and a distribution operation in Australia. The cost of producing one unit of a 
product in New Zealand is NZ$5.00. The finished product is then sold in 









Sales to third 
parties $ 15 
COMBINED PROFIT $10 
The allocation of the $10.00 per unit profit is determined by the price at which 
the product is transferred from the New Zealand manufacturing operation to 
the Australian distributing operation. This inter-operation price is referred to 
as the transfer price. 
At one extreme, the transfer price might be set equal to the cost to the New 
Zealand operation ($5.00). 
The entire profit from each unit sold will then accrue to the Australian 
operation: 
New Zealand Operation 








At the other extreme, the transfer price might be set equal to the ultimate 
selling price of the Australian operation ($15.00). The entire profit from each 
unit sold will then accrue to the New Zealand operation instead: 
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New Zealand Operation Australian Operation 
Transfer price $5.00 
Sales $15.00 $15.00 
Costs ($5.00) ($15.00) 
Profit $10.00 $0.00 
The transfer price adopted by a multinational determines where the profits of 
that multinational are sourced. Consequently, it also determines whether tax 
is imposed on the amount of income truly attributable to each jurisdiction in 
which the multinational operates. From a host government's perspective, 
therefore, the focus of transfer pricing rules is to ensure that the proper 
amount of income is attributed to its jurisdiction. 
Arm's length principle in New Zealand law 
New transfer pricing rules was enacted by the Income Tax Act 1994 
Amendment Act (No. 3) 1995. The rules replaced the ones formerly found in 
section GC1 (section 22, Income Tax Act 1976). The new rules apply from 
the start of the 1996/97 income year. 
Tax Information Bulletin Vol 7, No 11 (March 1996) provides a detailed 
description of how the legislation works. What follows is a discussion of the 
arm's length principle, the concept on which the legislative mechanics have 
been built. 
New Zealand's transfer pricing rules are based on the arm's length principle. 
The arm's length principle is stated in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention: 
"[When] conditions are made or imposed between...two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits 
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, 
but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in 
the profits of that enterprise and taxes accordingly." 
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Fundamentally, the arm's length principle is based on the notion that the 
operation of market forces results in a true return to the economic contribution 
of participants in transaction. 
By seeking to remove the effect of the common ownership, the arm's length 
principle seeks to reduce a transaction within a multinational to one that 
reflects the conditions that would have existed had the pricing of the 
transaction been governed by market forces. In this way, the true return to 
economic contribution for each member of the multinational is determined. 
The arm's length principle has been enacted into New Zealand legislation in 
section GD13 (6): 
"[The] arm's length amount of consideration must be determined by 
applying whichever...method...will produce the most reliable measure 
of the amount completely independent parties would have agreed upon 
after real and fully adequate bargaining." 
This rule does not say that an arm's length price will result if multinational sets 
its prices based on real and full internal bargaining. Rather, it recognizes that 
real and fully adequate bargaining between unrelated parties is a feature of 
the operation of market forces in a transaction. Section GD13 (6) therefore 
requires a multinational to adopt the price that may have arisen had its 
controlled transaction been governed by normal market forces. 
The problem to be resolved is how a multinational should determine what 
price would have arisen if its transactions were subject to market forces. 
The solution advanced by the arm's length principle is that a comparable 
transaction between independent parties (an "uncontrolled transaction") 
should be used as a benchmark against which to appraise the multinational's 
prices (the "controlled transaction"). Any differences between the two 
transactions can then be identified and adjusted for. By adjusting the price 
adopted in the uncontrolled transaction to reflect these differences, and arm's 
length price can be determined for the multinational's transaction. 
4I 
This, in simple form, is what applying the arm's length principle is about. Thus 
theme is developed in subsequent chapters of these guidelines. 
Reasons for adopting arm's length principle 
New Zealand has adopted the arm's length principle for two main reasons: 
• The arm's length approach is considered the most reliable way to 
determine the amount of income properly attributable to a 
multinational's New Zealand operations. 
• Because the arm's length approach represents the international 
norm, the potential for double taxation is minimized. 
Merit of arm's length approach for determining net income 
A significant reason for adopting the arm's length principle is that it is 
considered to provide the most accurate measurement of the fair market 
value of the true economic contribution of members of a multinational. 
Parties transacting at arm's length would be expected to endeavour to make 
efficient use of their resources. In doing this, firms seek to earn the full return 
to their economic activities. The arm's length principle used the behavior of 
an independent firm as the benchmark for what would be expected of a firm 
seeking to earn the true return from its economic contribution. By applying 
this benchmark to a multinational, the arm's length principle seeks to remove 
the effect of any ownership relationship between members of the multinational 
from the transfer price it adopts. 
It is anticipated that this will result in each member of the multinational earning 
a return that is commensurate with its economic contribution and risk 
assumed. 
The arm's length principle also results in abroad parity of tax treatment for 
multinationals and independent enterprises. This avoids the creation of tax 
advantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive positions of 
either type of entity. 
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!n so removing these tax considerations from economic decisions the arm's 
length principle promotes the growth of international trade and investment. 
Minimization of double taxation 
Double taxation is undesirable from the Government's perspective, as well as 
from that of the multinational. While double taxation may increase tax 
revenue, at least in the short run, it is not conductive to the encouragement of 
international trade and investment. This could have a detrimental effect on 
the economy in the long run. 
The potential for double taxation is illustrated by revisiting our earlier example. 
Consider the effect if Inland Revenue were to require a transfer price of 
$12.00 to be adopted by the multinational, while the Australian Tax Office 
(ATO) required a price of $10.00 to be adopted instead. The following profit 
allocations would then result: 





The true combined profit has remained unchanged at $10.00 per unit. 
However, the multinational is required to return $12.00 per unit for tax 
purposes. Clearly, tax is being imposed on more than 100% of the 
multinational's profit. 
To address this concern, an important principle followed in developing New 
Zealand's rules was the need for consistency with the international norm. To 
this end, both the legislation and New Zealand's guidelines have been based 
on the international consensus expressed in the OECD guidelines, which deal 
with the appropriateness and application of the arm's length principle in 










Because New Zealand's approach is consistent with the arm's length 
approach adopted by other jurisdictions, it should be easier for Inland 
Revenue to work with foreign tax authorities to minimize the potential for 
double taxation. 
Practical application of arm's length principle 
Key Points 
• Practical transfer pricing generally involves following a process to 
determine arm's length transfer prices. The four-step process 
developed by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) is one such process that 
may be followed. 
• Inland Revenue endorses the four-step process as a useful tool for 
taxpayers to develop their reasoning and documentation needed to 
support their evaluation of their transfer prices. However, taxpayers 
are not obliged to use the process in determining their transfer prices. 
• In developing a process for determining transfer prices, taxpayers need 
to be aware that their purpose is ultimately to be able to persuade 
Inland Revenue that their transfer prices are consistent with the arm's 
length principle. 
Taxpayers are encouraged to consider discussion their transfer pricing 
process with Inland Revenue if they are concerned about their 
acceptability to the Department. 
Introduction 
Previous chapters considered the theory behind the acceptable transfer 
pricing methods, and the principles of comparability that underpin all transfer 
pricing analysis. This chapter aims to work to determine their transfer prices. 
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Inland Revenue's view is that when taxpayers use the four-step process 
outlined in this chapter, it will help develop the reasoning and documentation 
needed to support their evaluation of their transfer prices. 
However, the process outlined is neither mandatory nor prescriptive - the 
process can be costly and sometimes require expert assistance. The process 
adopted by a taxpayer will, therefore, still depend on those taxpayers 
individual circumstances. Taxpayers should weigh up the costs of developing 
a more comprehensive transfer pricing analysis against the risk that Inland 
Revenue will audit and adjust the taxpayer's transfer prices. 
Caveats to four-step process 
Several caveats must be borne in mind when considering the following 
process: 
a) The approach outlined below assumes that the nature of the 
international dealings is fairly extensive and necessitates a thorough 
analysis. For enterprises with relatively simple and/or low value 
international dealings with related parties, the extent of any data 
collection and analysis may be minimal. 
b) It may be possible in some cases to adopt either a pricing method or a 
specific price that has been developed and applied by a multinational 
on a global basis, after some confirmatory analysis and consideration 
of its suitability and reliability in relation to the New Zealand member of 
the multinational. However, the data used to support the pricing 
method will need to be carefully considered in terms of its relevance 
and reliability for New Zealand market conditions. 
c) The analysis contained in this chapter complements the documentation 
created by enterprises in the normal course of their business dealings. 
Related parties need to show that their association has not 
inappropriately affected the nature and term of their deadlines. 
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This requires them to undertake more analysis and keep specific 
records to demonstrate the arm's length nature of their dealings in 
circumstances where independent enterprises could merely rely on 
their normal business records. This additional requirement cannot be 
eliminated without sacrificing the integrity of New Zealand's transfer 
pricing rules. 
This is an illustration of the four-step process for setting or reviewing transfer 
prices between associated enterprises. If this process is properly undertaken 
the taxpayer should have a lower risk of audit adjustment or penalty. 
46 
Figure 1 
Step 1 : Understand the cross-border dealings between the associated enterprises 
in the context of the taxpayer's business 
Identify cross- border dealing with associated 
enterprises and collect or maintain relevant 
documentation to explain the nature of those 
dealings in the context of the taxpayer's 
business. 
For example: 
Nature and extent of dealing with 
associates 
Business lines and the size, scope, value 
and types of dealings 
Nature of industry 
Nature of the competition it experiences 
Business strategies and processes. 
Undertake a preliminary 
functional analysis of the 
functions undertaken, 
risks assumed and the 
assets employed to assist 
in understanding the 
business and selecting 
and applying a 
methodology. 
Step 2: Select the methodology or methodologies 
Broadly identify any 
comparable uncontrolled 
dealings. Assess the 
reliability of data on 
comparable dealings or 
comparable enterprises. 
Determine the most appropriate 
methodology or methodologies based on 
the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case. Ensure that sufficient 
documentation and data is available to 
support the application. 
Step 3: Apply the methodology or methodologies 
Use the detailed data to extend 
and improve the functional 
analysis of the taxpayer and of 
any comparables. 
Refine, examine and organise the 
data to enable comparability to be 
assessed properly. 
To improve comparability, it may be 
necessary to: 
Extend the analysis over a number of 
years 
Adjust the data to account for 
material differences in comparability 
Apply several methods 
Data points or a range of results may 
emerge. 
It may be 
necessary to 
review earlier 
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Step 4: Determine the arm's length outcome and implement support processes. 
Instal review process to ensure adjustment for material changes. 
Decide on the arm's length outcome. 
Record practical considerations such 
as: 
Any judgments made 
How data points or ranges were 
interpreted 
How results from different 
methods were used. 
If the data used to establish the 
outcome changes then review 
process and methodology. 
Put system in place to support 
chosen method with a review 
mechanism to ensure adjustment 
if material changes occur. 
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Step 1: Understand the cross-border dealings between related parties in the 
context of the business 
The taxpayer and Inland Revenue staff will need to understand the nature and 
extent of the dealings between the taxpayer and related parties in the context 
of the taxpayer's business. It is important for a taxpayer to be able to explain: 
• How the international related-party dealings of the enterprise are 
undertaken 
• The purpose or object of the dealings 
• What the taxpayer obtains from its participation in the dealings, 
such as products, services, or strategic relationships 
• The significance of the dealings to the taxpayer's overall 
business activities and those of the multinational group. 
At this stage of the process, therefore, the taxpayer should prepare some 
documentation that outlines these considerations. The insight developed in 
this process will assist in determining the extent of any functional analysis that 
might be needed for an analysis of comparability in applying the arm's length 
principle. 
The taxpayer should also develop a preliminary functional analysis to consider 
the broad functions performed by the relevant members of the multinational. 
This will assist in determining an appropriate pricing method in step 2 of the 
process. 
The functional analysis should not be comprehensive at this stage. As will be 
discussed in step 3 of the process, the detail included in the functional 
analysis is affected by a taxpayer's choice of pricing method. At this stage, 
the aim of the functional analysis should be to determine which method (or 
methods) is likely to be appropriate to the taxpayer's circumstances, and the 
nature of the information that will be required to apply that method. 
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A taxpayer should also, at this stage, begin to assess potential sources of 
information on which to base its analysis. These comparables may be 
identified internally within the group (if a member of the multinational transacts 
with an independent external party), or by reference to transactions between 
independent external parties. 
If internal comparables can be located, it is likely that they will be more 
reliable than external comparables. This is because: 
• They are more likely to "fit" the affiliated transaction as they 
occur within the context of the group's business. 
• More information about the comparable situation should be 
readily available. 
• One internal comparable may be sufficient to support a defense 
of the transaction under review, whereas a wider base of 
support by be required if external comparables are used. 
Location of comparables 
It should be noted, however, that internal transactions may not provide 
reliable comparables for determining an arm's length price if they do not occur 
on normal arm's length terms. This might be the case if: 
• They are not made in the ordinary course of business, or 
• One of the principle purposes of the uncontrolled transaction is 
to establish an arm's length price in relation to the controlled 
transaction. 
The following examples illustrate these points: 
Example 1 : 
A company is forced into bankruptcy and, as a result, sells all of its 
products to unrelated distributors for a liquidation price. Because 
those sales are not made in the ordinary course of business, they will 
not represent a valid comparable for transfer pricing purposes. 
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Example 2: 
A firm, operating at 95% of capacity, sells all of its output to related 
parties. To utilize its excess capacity and to establish an arm's 
length price, the firm increases its output to capacity. The additional 
output is then sold to an independent firm at a normal margin above 
marginal cost, with that margin being established with a view to 
creating a desirable comparable for transfer pricing purposes. 
The sale to the independent firm would not represent a valid 
comparable for transfer pricing purposes because one of the 
principle purposes of the transaction is to establish an arm's length 
price. 
Step 2: Select the pricing method or methods 
Section GD 13 (8) requires that the choice and resultant application of a 
method or methods for calculating an arm's length price must be made having 
regarded to: 
• The degree of comparability between the uncontrolled 
transactions used for comparison and the controlled 
transactions of the taxpayer 
• The completeness and accuracy of the data replied on 
• The reliability of all assumptions 
• The sensitivity of any results to possible deficiencies in the data 
and assumptions 
The application of these criteria will depend on the quality of the information 
available to the taxpayer. Thus at this stage of the process, the taxpayer will 
need to make an assessment of the quality of the data is has available. This 
assessment should be made for the purpose of determining which pricing 
method (or methods) is likely to provide the greatest consistency with the 
factors in section GD 13(8), and result in the most reliable measure of the 
arm's length price required under section GD13 (6). 
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To this end, the information obtained in step 1 can assist with the: 
• Determination of comparability when traditional transactional 
methods are appropriate, and/or 
• Determination of comparability between enterprises when 
pricing methods using profit comparisons are appropriate, 
and/or 
• Allocation of the consideration between the enterprises when a 
profit split method is applicable. 
Step 3: Application of the pricing method or methods 
Once a pricing method (or methods) has been chosen, the preliminary 
functional analysis prepared in step 1 can be extended to reflect that choice of 
method. Figure 1 shows how the functional analysis may be used differently 
depending upon the method that is used. 
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Figure 2: Use of functional analysis with each methodology 
NO YES 
An accurate comparables available, either from 
internal or external sources? 
Can transactional 
comparability be 
established on price, 






What functional analysis compares 
when using the following methods: 
1. Comparable uncontrolled price 
(CUP) method: The functional 
analysis compares third party 
dealings to the dealings between the 
associated enterprises in terms of the 
product characteristics and the 
market characteristics. The existence 
of special conditions * may need to 
be considered. 
2. Resale price method: The 
functional analysis compares the 
dealings between associated 
enterprises to third party dealings in 
terms of the functions performed 
(taking into account assets and risks 
assumed) and the market conditions. 
Product similarity should be 
considered, and also the existence of 
special conditions *. 
3. Cost plus method: The functional 
analysis compares the dealings 
between the associated enterprises to 
third party dealings in terms of the 
likely type of costs incurred and the 
margins to be obtained in the light of 
the functions performed and the 
market conditions. The existence of 
special conditions * may need to be 
considered. 
4. Transactional margin method: 
The functional analysis compares the 
functions (taking into account assets 
and risks assumed) in associated 
enterprises dealings with third parry 
dealings and the margins that are 
obtained. Industry and product 
similarity should be considered as 
well as the existence of special 
conditions. * 
Can comparability be 
obtained with increased 
aggregation of dealings? 
Can matter be 
appropriately resolved 
using profit split 
method? 
YES 
Profit split method: 
Functional analysis is 
then directed at 
identifying and 
establishing the 
relative importance of 
the contributions of the 
parties. 
YES 
May need to perform 
transactional analysis using 
less reliable comparables 
Use a similar approach to 
the transactional methods 
but the financial analysis has 
a broader focus 
*Special conditions include factors bearing 
On comparability such as the economic circumstances 
and the business strategies that have been adopted. 
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If a pricing method involving external benchmarking with independent 
enterprises is being used, the functional analysis assists in determining the 
comparability of the dealings of the multinational with uncontrolled dealings of 
the independent parties. The main purpose of this is to establish the degree 
of comparability. It is not, therefore, necessary to value the functions, assets 
and risks of each of the enterprises separately. However, it is essential to 
ensure that if there are differences in the significance of the functions, assets 
and risks to each of the business that these differences are taken into 
account. 
The functional analysis can be performed with varying levels of detail and can 
serve a variety of purposes. The analysis may be applied on a product or 
divisional basis for individual transactions, or it could be applied up to a 
corporate group basis. The scope of the analysis will be determined by the 
nature, value and complexity of the matters covered by international dealings. 
It will also be determined by the nature of the taxpayer's business activities, 
including the strategies that the enterprise pursues and the features of its 
products or services. 
Step 4: Arriving at the arm's length amount and introducing processes to 
support the chosen method 
The taxpayer will be required to demonstrate how its data has been used in 
the application of its chosen pricing method to determine an arm's length 
amount. 
The process to date can deliver to a taxpayer an objective, documented and 
considered review of the available material and possible choices for arriving at 
an arm's length outcome. However, the nature of the arm's length principle is 
such that there are a number of practical problems in its application. Transfer 
pricing will always require an element of judgment, and taxpayers and Inland 
Revenue need to bear this in mind in undertaking their transfer pricing 
analysis. 
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It also needs to be noted that transfer pricing does not end with the initial 
analysis. Taxpayers will need to implement appropriate processes to: 
• Ensure the availability of data for subsequent review analysis, 
and 
• Allow modifications to be made in the choice and application of 
pricing method to reflect changes in their circumstances or 
market conditions, or if the process followed does not result in a 
commercially realistic outcome given their facts and 
circumstances. 
Cost contribution arrangements (CCAs) 
Key Points 
• A CCA is a contractual arrangement whereby the contracting parties 
agree to contribute costs in proportion to their overall expected benefits 
from the arrangement. 
• To satisfy the arm's length principle, a participant's contribution must 
be consistent with what an independent enterprise would have agreed 
to pay in comparable circumstances. 
• Difficulties can arise in measuring the value of a participant's 
contribution and the expected value of its benefits. Participants should 
ensure that any judgment made leads to commercially justifiable 
conclusions. 
Introduction 
A CCA is a framework agreed among business enterprises to share the costs 
and risks of developing, producing or obtaining assets, services, or rights. It 
also determines the nature and extent of the interest of each participant in 
those assets, services, or rights. It is a contractual arrangement under which 
a member's share of contributions should be consistent with its expected 
benefits from the arrangement. 
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Each member is also entitled to exploit its interest in the CCA separately as 
an effective owner, rather than as a licensee-it does not need to pay a royalty 
or other consideration for that right (paragraph 8.3, OECD guidelines). There 
is no standard framework for a CCA-each arrangement will depend on its own 
unique facts and circumstances. 
A CCA should be distinguished from the scenario where members of a MNE 
jointly fund a new entity which then develops and exploits intangible property 
in its own right. In that case, the new entity will own any intangible property 
that it creates, and would be expected to derive an arm's length return from 
the exploitation of that intangible. The return to the members funding the new 
entity would be based on the form of capital contributed (for example, interest 
paid on debt or dividends paid on equity), rather than by benefiting directly 
from the intangible property. 
The OECD guidelines suggest that the most likely area in which CCAs will 
arise will relate to the development of intangible property. However, the 
guidelines note that CCAs may also be used for any joint funding activity, 
such as centralized management services or developing advertising 
campaigns common to the participants' markets (paragraphs 8.6 and 8.7). 
There are a number of significant issues that have not yet been resolved by 
the OECD (paragraph 8.1, OECD guidelines). The OECD guidelines appear 
likely to be developed further, therefore, as member countries gain experience 
in applying the arm's length principle to CCAs. 
There may also be an issue over whether CCAs will be acceptable in 
overseas jurisdictions. For example, some jurisdictions may limit the use of 
CCAs to the development of intangible property, while others may not 
recognize them at all. If a CCA is not recognized in an overseas jurisdiction, 
there is potential for double taxation to occur. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the OECD guidelines 
on CCAs. The discussion is not, however, exhaustive of issues canvassed in 
the OECD guidelines. For example, the OECD guidelines contain a detailed 
discussion on documents that would be useful to document adequately a CCA 
(paragraphs 8.41 to 8.43). If a taxpayer does intend entering into CCA, the 
OECD guidelines are essential reading before entering into the arrangement. 
Applying arm's length principle to CCAs 
For a CCA to satisfy the arm's length principle, a participant's contribution 
must be consistent with what an independent enterprise would have agreed to 
pay in comparable circumstances (paragraph 8.8, OECD guidelines). 
Independent enterprises would require that each participant's proportionate 
share of the actual overall contributions to the CCA be consistent with the 
participant's proportionate share of the overall expected benefits to be 
received under the arrangement (paragraph 8.9, OECD guidelines). 
Applying the arm's length principle to CCAs, therefore, requires the 
determination of: 
• the participants in the CCA 
• each participant's relative contribution to the joint activity, and 
• the appropriate allocation of contributions, based on each participant's 
expected benefits. 
Identification of participants 
Because the concept of mutual benefit is fundamental to a CCA, a participant 
must have a reasonable expectation that it will benefit from the CCA activity 
itself. A participant must receive a beneficial interest in the property or 
services that are the subject of the CCA activity and have a reasonable 
expectation of being able to exploit that interest, directly or indirectly. 
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A member of the MNE that performs part of the CCA activity but does not 
stand to benefit from the outcome of the CCA activity cannot be a participant 
of the CCA, Instead, it should be compensated by way of an arm's length 
charge for the services it performs for the CCA. This principle is illustrated in 
example 3. 
Example 3 
Three members of a MNE marketing a product in the same regional market in 
which consumers have similar preferences, want to enter a CCA to develop a 
joint advertising campaign. A fourth member of the MNE helps develop the 
advertising campaign, but does not itself market the product. 
The fourth member will not be a participant in the CCA; both because it does 
not receive a beneficial interest in the services subject to the CCA activity and 
would not, in any case, have a reasonable expectation of being able to exploit 
any interest. The three participants in the CCA would, therefore, compensate 
the fourth member by way of an arm's length payment for the advertising 
services provided to the CCA. 
Amount of participant's contribution 
As contributions are to be made to a CCA in proportion to expected benefits, it 
is necessary to be able to value each member's contribution. Following the 
arm's length principle, the value of each participant's contribution is the value 
that independent enterprises would have assigned to the contribution in 
comparable circumstances. 
Contributions to a CCA could be monetary or non-monetary. Non-monetary 
contributions might include, for example, the use of a participant's existing 
intangible assets or the provision of services by a participant. 
When the contribution is cash, its value can easily be quantified. There are, 
however, a number of difficulties in valuing non-monetary contributions that 
have not yet been fully resolved in the OECD guidelines. 
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For example: 
• Should cost or market value be used in valuing contributions? 
• How should the value of property or services provided be 
apportioned when they are only partly applied in the CCA activity 
with the balance applied in the provider's other activities? 
These issues will need to be resolved on a facts and circumstances basis. 
The key consideration, however, is to ensure that the valuation approach 
adopted is commercially justifiable, and that independent firms would have 
been prepared to accept the terms of the CCA given the valuations adopted. 
Appropriateness of allocation 
While a participant's contribution must be consistent with its expected benefits 
if a CCA is to satisfy the arm's length principle, there is, however, no universal 
rule for estimating the expected benefits to be obtained by each participant in 
a CCA (paragraph 8.19, OECD guidelines). Possible techniques include (but 
are not limited to): 
• Estimation based on anticipated additional income that will be 
generated or costs that will be saved as a result of entering the 
CCA. 
• The use of an appropriate allocation key, perhaps based on sales, 
units used, produced or sold, gross or operating profits, numbers of 
employees, capital invested, or alternative keys. 
Again, appraisal of the appropriateness of the cost allocations will be based 
on facts and circumstances. The key consideration, however, is to ensure the 
benefits estimated are consistent with the benefits that an independent firm 
might have expected to receive from the CCA. 
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Balancing payments 
Balancing payments may be required to adjust participants' proportionate 
shares of contributions (paragraph 8.18, OECD guidelines). If, for example, a 
participant's contribution exceeds its expected share of the benefits from the 
CCA, a payment should be made to that participant from the other participants 
so that its contributions and expected benefits are reconciled. 
Tax treatment of contributions and balancing payments 
The tax treatment of contributions to a CCA will depend on the character of 
the payment. If the expenditure would be deductible if it were to be incurred 
outside the CCA, the expenditure will be deductible. If, however, the 
expenditure would be treated as capital expenditure if it were to be incurred 
outside the CCA, the expenditure will be non-deductible. 
A balancing payment is treated as an addition to the costs of a payer and as a 
reimbursement (reduction) of costs to the recipient. If a balancing payment 
exceeds the recipient's deductible expenditures, the tax treatment of the 
excess payment will depend on what the payment is made for. 
No part of a contribution or balancing payment in respect of a CCA will 
constitute a royalty for the use of intangible property, because each 
participant in the CCA receives a right to exploit intangible property arising 
from the CCA by virtue of being a participant in the CCA. 
Conclusions on applying arm's length principle to CCAs 
The proceeding discussion suggests that it may be difficult to locate 
comparable data on which to apply the arm's length principle to CCAs. 
Participants to a CCA may, therefore, need to depend on the exercise of 
"commercially justifiable" judgment in determining the value of the 
contributions and the expected benefits of each participant. Each case will 
depend on its own facts and circumstances. 
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Taxpayers should ensure in particular that: 
• valuations of non-cash contributions to a CCA are consistent for 
each party's contribution and commercially justifiable; and 
• expected benefits are estimated in such a way that an independent 
enterprise would be prepared to use the outcome of the estimation 
as a basis for determining whether it would accept the terms of the 
CCA. 
Structure of CCA 
Paragraph 8.40 of the OECD guidelines lists a number of conditions that a 
CCA at arm's length would ordinarily meet. These conditions, set out below, 
may provide a useful guide when formulating a CCA. 
(a) The participants would include only enterprises expected to derive 
mutual benefits from the CCA activity itself, either directly or indirectly 
(and not just from performing part or all of the activity). 
(b) The arrangement would specify the nature and extent of each 
participant's beneficial interest in the results of the CCA activity. 
(c) No payment other than the CCA contributions, appropriate 
balancing payments and buy-in payments would be made for the 
beneficial interest in property, services, or rights obtained through the 
CCA. 
(d) The proportionate shares of contributions would be determined in a 
proper manner using an allocation method reflecting the sharing of 
expected benefits from the arrangement. 
(e) The arrangement would allow for balancing payments or for the 
allocation of contributions to be changed prospectively after a 
reasonable period of time to reflect changes in proportionate shares of 
expected benefits among the participants. 
(f) Adjustments would be made as necessary (including the possibility 
of buy-in and buy-out I payments) upon the withdrawal of a participant 
and upon termination of the CCA. 
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Summary 
This chapter has considered the following key points: 
• A CCA is a contractual arrangement whereby participants agree to 
shares costs on the basis of expected benefits from the 
arrangement. 
• To satisfy the arm's length principle, a participant's contribution 
must be consistent with what an independent enterprise would have 
agreed to pay in comparable circumstances. 
• Difficulties can arise in measuring the value of a participant's 
contribution and the expected value of its benefits. Any judgments 




6. Principles of Comparability 
Introduction 
Comparability is fundamental to the application of the arm's length principle. 
The preferred arm's length methods are based on the concept of comparing 
the prices/margins achieved by connected persons in their dealings to those 
achieved by independent entities for the same or similar dealings. In order for 
such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant characteristics of 
the situations being compared must be highly comparable. 
To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the 
situations being compared could materially affect the condition being 
examined in the method (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate 
adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. If 
suitable adjustments cannot be made, then the dealings cannot be considered 
comparable. 
Since precise calculations cannot be made and the application of any method 
involves elements of judgement, there is, depending on the circumstances of 
the particular case, a need to avoid making adjustments to account for minor 
or marginal differences in comparability. 
The objective of comparability is to always seek the highest practical degree 
of comparability, recognising though that there will be unique situations and 
cases involving unique intangibles where it is not practicable to apply methods 
based on a high degree of direct comparability. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
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The practicable standard of comparability will be determined by the amount of 
data on which comparisons with uncontrolled situations and dealings in a 
particular case can be based. Comparisons with controlled dealings by other 
taxpayers cannot be regarded as arm's length comparisons. 
The assessment of comparability can be affected, inter alia, by: 
a. The characteristics of good and services; 
b. The relative importance of functions performed; 
c. The terms and conditions of relevant agreements; 
d. The relative risk assumed by the taxpayer, connected 
enterprises and any independent party where such party is 
considered as a possible comparable; 
e. Economic and market conditions; and 
f. Business strategies 
Characteristics of the property or services 
Differences in the specific characteristics of property or services account, at 
least in part, for differences in their value in the open market. The OECD 
Guidelines, at paragraphia9 mention a non-exhaustive list of features that 
may be relevant in comparing two products 
Tangible property: 
Physical features 
Quality and reliability 
Availability 
Volume of supply 
Intangible property: 
Form of the transaction 
Type of property 
Duration of protection 
Degree of protection 
Anticipated benefits from 
use 
Services: 
Nature of services 
Extent of services 
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The significance of the actual characteristics of a product or services being 
transferred in determining an arm's length price depends on the method 
applied in determining an arm's length price. For example, in applying the 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method, the actual characteristics of 
the goods or services are critical. On the other hand, when the Transactional 
Net Margin method is applied, the characteristics of the goods or services 
transferred are not nearly as important as the functions and risks undertaken 
by the relevant entities. 
Functions undertaken 
The compensation for the transfer of property or services between two 
independent enterprises will usually reflect the functions that each enterprise 
performs, taking into account the risks assumed and the assets used. In 
determining whether two transactions are comparable, the functions and risks 
undertaken by the independent parties should be compared to those 
undertaken by the connected persons. 
Economic theory predicts that when various functions are performed by a 
group of independent enterprises, the enterprise that provides most of the 
effort and, more particularly, the rare or unique functions, and assumes the 
most risk should earn a greater portion of the profit. For example, a 
subsidiary may be responsible for the entire assembly of a product. If the 
trademark, know-how and the selling effort rest with the parent and subsidiary 
is only acting as a contract manufacturer, the subsidiary should be entitled to 
a relatively smaller portion of the profit (representing a fair return on the 
functions it performs.) 
Most of the recommended transfer pricing methods (Cost Plus, Resale Price, 
Transactional Net Margin and Profit Split methods) focus on functions 
performed, risks assumed and assets utilised rather than on the goods or 
services being transferred. 
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When applying one of these methods in a transfer pricing analysis, the 
comparability of functions performed by the member of the multinational and 
the independent entity or entities to which it is compared is very important. In 
contrast thereto the CUP method is based on a direct comparison of the price 
charged for goods or services and the characteristics of the goods or services 
are therefore significant. 
A practical way of evaluating functional comparability is to prepare a 
functional analysis. A functional analysis is a method of finding and 
organising facts about a business' functions, assets (including intangible 
property) and risks. It aims to determine how these are divided between the 
parties involved in the transaction under review. 
Functional analysis serves, therefore, to identify the economically significant 
activities (functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed) that are 
undertaken by the member of a multinational, and for which it should expect 
to be rewarded. This identifies the nature and characteristics of the 
connected party dealings that have to be priced. 
Functional analysis also serves to help appraise the validity of an independent 
firm, as a benchmark for appraising the behaviour of a member of a 
multinational. Consider, for example, an independent firm and a member of a 
multinational that both sell toasters. The independent firm sells at the retail 
level with a liability for claims under warranty. By contrast, the member of the 
multinational sells at the wholesale level with no liability for defects. In this 
case, the independent firm's functions are quite different from those of the 
member of the multinational and would not ordinarily be used as a 
comparable. The member of the multinational should, instead, attempt to 
locate a comparable independent firm operating at the same level of the 
market, performing similar functions and assuming similar risks. 
A functional analysis will help to highlight where such significant functional 
differences may exist. However, it must be not that functional analysis is not 
a pricing method in its own right. 
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Rather, it is a tool assisting in the selection of a transfer pricing method and 
the proper determination of an arm's length price. 
The extent to which functional analysis should be performed depends on the 
transactions at issue. For more involved transactions a functional analysis 
should address all of the following: 
• An overview of the organisation, the overall structure and nature of the 
business undertaken by a member of a multinational. 
• General commercial and industry conditions affecting the member of 
the multinational, and explanation of the current business environment 
and its predicted changes. 
• Direct consideration of the transaction under review, the nature and 
terms of the transaction, economic conditions and property involved in 
the transaction, how the product or service that is the subject of the 
controlled transaction in question flows between the connected parties, 
• Actual contractual terms of the transaction, because this may provide 
evidence about the form in which the responsibilities, risks and benefits 
have been assigned among those members. 
• The functions undertaken by the relevant members of the multinational. 
• The relative contributions of various functions: The number of 
functions performed by a particular member of a multinational is not 
decisive in determining whether that member should derive the greater 
share of the profit. It is the relative importance of each function that is 
relevant. 
• An appraisal of risk. In the open market, this assumption of increased 
risk will be compensated for by an increase in the expected return. 
The risks assumed should therefore be taken into account in the 
functional analysis. 
• It must also be considered whether a purported allocation of risk is 
consistent with the economic substance of the transaction. In this 
regard, the parties' conduct should generally be taken as the best 
evidence concerning the true allocation of risk. 
66 
The functions undertaken by an entity will, to some extent, determine 
the allocation of risks. 
Economic circumstances 
Arm's length prices may vary across different markets, even for transactions 
involving the same product or service. To achieve comparability, it is 
important to ensure that the markets in which the parties operate are 
comparable. Any differences must either not have a material effect on price, 
or be differences for which appropriate adjustments can be made. 
The OECD Guidelines at paragraph 1.30, identify a number of factors relevant 
for comparing markets, including: 
• Geographic location of the market; 
• Size of markets; 
• Extent of competition in the markets; 
• Availability of substitute goods and services; 
• Transport costs; 
• The level of the market (retail or wholesale). 
These factors may have particular relevance in the South African situation. 
Because South Africa is a small country, it may be difficult to obtain 
comparables from the South African market. 
Business strategies 
Business strategies are also relevant in determining comparability for transfer 
pricing purposes. Business strategies are a legitimate aspect of arm's length 
operations. The arm's length principle, therefore, acknowledges those 
strategies. Business strategies would take into account many aspects of an 
enterprise, such as innovation and new product development, degree of 
diversification, risk aversion and other factors which have bearing upon the 
daily conduct of business. 
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Business strategies could also include market penetration schemes. A 
taxpayer seeking to penetrate a new market or to expand (or defend) its 
market share might temporarily charge a lower price for its product than the 
price for otherwise comparable products in that market. Alternatively, it might 
temporarily incur higher costs (perhaps because of start-up costs or increased 
marketing efforts) and hence achieve lower profit levels than other taxpayers 
operating in the same market. 
The important issue is how one should appraise whether a business strategy 
that temporarily decreases profits in return for higher long-term profits is 
consistent with the arm's length principle. The relevant question here is 
whether a party operating at arm's length would have been prepared to 
sacrifice profitability for a similar period under such economic circumstances 
and competitive conditions. 
The Commissioner may consider a number of factors in evaluating a 
taxpayer's claim of following a strategy that temporarily reduces profits in 
return for higher long-term profits, for example, whether: 
• the conduct of the parties is consistent with the professed business 
strategy; 
• the nature of the relationship between the parties to the controlled 
transaction justifies that the taxpayer bears the costs of the business 
strategy; 
• there is a plausible expectation that the business strategy will produce 
a return sufficient to justify its costs, within a period of time that would 
be acceptable in an arm's length arrangement. 
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Acceptable Methods for Determining an Arm's Length Price 
Introduction 
Neither Section 31 nor the tax treaties entered into by South Africa prescribe 
any particular methodology for the purpose of ascertaining an arm's length 
consideration. Given that there is no prescribed legislative preference, the 
Commissioner would generally seek to use the methods that have been set 
out below. 
The most appropriate method in a given case will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of the case and the extent and reliability of data on which to 
base a comparability analysis. It should always be the intention to select the 
method that produces the highest degree of comparability. 
The choice of the most appropriate method should therefore be based on a 
practical weighting of the evidence, having regard to: 
• the nature of the activities being examined. 
• the availability, quality and reliability of the data, 
• the nature and extent of any assumptions, and 
• the degree of comparability that exists between the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions where the difference would affect conditions 
in the arm's length dealings being examined. 
In cases where there are no comparables or there is insufficient information to 
determine an arm's length outcome, the method to be used should be a 
method that produces a reasonable estimate of an arm's length outcome. 
Such estimate must be based on the facts in hand. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
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The application of the principles set out in this Practice Note may require the 
exercise of judgement. 
After the identification of an independent benchmark or benchmarks against 
which the pricing of a multinational is to be compared, it needs to be 
established to what extent the functions of the members of a multinational are 
similar to or differ from those of the independent benchmark(s). An element 
of judgement is required to determine the extent to which these similarities or 
differences have a material effect on the transfer price adopted by the 
multinational. 
As a general rule, the most reliable method will be the one that requires fewer 
and more reliable adjustments to be made. Taxpayers will not be required to 
undertake an intricate analysis of all the methodologies, but should have a 
sound basis for using the selected methodology. This could entail providing 
reasons why secondary methods are not appropriate. 
This section of the Practice Note considers the principles underlying each of 
the various transfer pricing methods. An understanding of these principles is 
useful for identifying the limitations of each method and applying the methods 
in practice. 
The principle methods referred to in the OECD Guidelines 
Several transfer pricing methods have been developed in international 
practice for determining and appraising a taxpayer's transfer prices. These 
methods are based on measuring a multinational's pricing strategies against a 
benchmark of the pricing behaviour of independent entities in uncontrolled 
transactions. 
The standard transfer pricing methods recognised by the OECD Guidelines 
are: 
• the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method); 
• the resale price method (RP method); 
70 
• the cost plus method (CP method); 
• the transactional net margin method (TNMM); and 
• the profit split method. 
The CUP, RP and CP methods are know as the traditional transaction 
methods and the TNMM and profit split method are referred to as 
transactional profit methods. 
The Commissioner endorses the CUP, RP, CP, TNMM and profit split 
methods as acceptable transfer pricing methods, the most appropriate of 
these depending on the particular situation and the extent of reliable data to 
enable its proper application. 
The hierarchy of methods 
Section 31 does not impose a hierarchy for the transfer pricing methods. 
However, there is in effect a hierarchy, in that certain methods may provide a 
more reliable result than others, depending on the quality of available data 
and the taxpayer's circumstances. 
The Commissioner acknowledges that the suitability and reliability of a 
method will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The most 
reliable method will be the one that requires fewer and more reliable 
adjustments. 
It is essential to have an understanding of the commercial and economic 
reality underlying any particular transaction before beginning with a search 
for, and close examination of comparable transactions between unrelated 
enterprises in an application of the traditional arm's length methods. 
As a general rule, the traditional transaction methods are preferred. 
7] 
Of these methods the CUP method is preferred, as it looks directly to the 
product or service transferred and is relatively insensitive to the specific 
functions which are performed by the entities being compared. 
The RP and CP methods look at valuing the functions performed. Because 
these methods examine gross margins, operating expenses are excluded and 
therefore the impact of relative cost structures should not be material. 
In practice, the traditional methods may not be able to be applied, because of 
information constraints, particularly the lack of comparable uncontrolled 
transactions or published data on gross margins. Hence it may be necessary 
to resort to the transactional profits methods. 
Of the transactional profits methods, the TNMM is reasonably objective 
because comparables are applied. Essentially, this is either the RP or CP 
with varying levels of operating expenses incorporated into the calculations. 
In theory the TNMM is inferior to the RP or CP methods where sufficient 
information is available to apply all three methods, because comparing 
operating expenses requires a similar structure of business to be truly reliable. 
This presents a more difficult threshold than functional comparability. 
Where a taxpayer has considered a number of methods, it may be 
appropriate to document the reasons for discarding some of those methods. 
The availability of data is likely to be very important in a taxpayer's choice of 
method. South Africa is a small market and under certain circumstances this 
means reliable comparables may be difficult for taxpayers to locate. 
The CUP method 
Description 
In applying the CUP method, a direct comparison is drawn between the price 
charged for a specific product in a controlled transaction and the price 
charged for a closely comparable product in an uncontrolled transaction, in 
comparable circumstances. 
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It therefore primarily focuses on the goods being transferred or service being 
rendered, but also takes into account broader business functions and 
economic circumstance. 
Differences between the two prices may indicate the existence of non-arm's 
length conditions and that the price in the controlled transaction may need to 
be substituted for the price in the uncontrolled transaction. 
Application 
The CUP method is the most direct and reliable way to apply the arm's length 
principle where it is possible to locate comparable uncontrolled transactions. 
A comparable uncontrolled price can be determined by reference to similar 
products or services transferred under similar circumstances by the taxpayer 
to an independent party (internal comparable) or by reference to similar 
products or services transferred under similar circumstances by one 
independent party to another (external comparable). 
The two transactions being compared will only be truly comparable if there are 
no differences between the two transactions that will have a material effect on 
the price, or if reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the 
effect of differences that may materially affect the price. 
It is important to keep in mind that two transactions will not be comparable 
merely because the product or service transferred is comparable. Regard 
should also be had to the effect on price of broader business functions and 
economic circumstances other than just the product comparability. 
Listed below are examples of where adjustments may be necessary when 
comparable products or services are transferred between independent parties 
or the taxpayer and an independent third party: 
(a) terms of transactions may differ (for example, credit terms) 
(b) volumes transferred may differ significantly e.g. sell 10 tonnes to an 
independent party vs. 1000 tonnes to a connected person 
(c) sell FOB to a connected person and at CIF to an independent party 
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Certain adjustments could be very difficult to effect, such as differences in -
(a) the quality of the products 
(b) geographic markets 
(c) market levels 
(d) amount and type of intangible property involved 
Practical problems 
It is usually very difficult to find a transaction between independent enterprises 
which is sufficiently similar to a controlled transaction, without differences 
which have a material effect on price. 
Where differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, 
or between the enterprises undertaking those transactions, it may be difficult 
or impossible to determine reasonably accurate adjustments to eliminate the 
effect on price. 
Example 4 
A South African enterprise, A, manufactures crocodile leather shoes and travel bags. 
The shoes are sold to a French subsidiary, B, which sells the shoes to unconnected 
exclusive boutiques. The credit terms to B are 90 days. A also sells the shoes to 
two independent distributors in France, C and D. The credit terms to the 
independent parties are 30 days. C sells the shoes directly to end-users and D sells 
the shoes to expensive shoe shops in Oxford and Bond Street in London. A also 
sells the travel bags to an independent distributor in France. 
Possible CUP's: 
The travel bags sold to the independent distributor in France will not constitute a 
CUP because the product is not similar to shoes and the price is not comparable. 
The shoes sold to C would also not qualify as a CUP because the level of the market 
is different. B is at a higher level in the distribution chain than C and it is unlikely to 
be possible to quantify this difference and make reliable adjustments. 
The shoes sold to D may be a valid CUP if the Paris and London markets are 
comparable. It will, however, be necessary to adjust the price for the difference in 
credit terms. 
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The Resale Price method 
Description 
The resale price method is based on the price at which a product, which has 
been purchased from a connected enterprise, is resold to an independent 
enterprise. The resale price is then reduced by an appropriate gross margin, 
to cover the reseller's selling and other operating costs, and to provide an 
appropriate profit, depending on functions performed, assets used and risks 
assumed by the reseller. The balance may be regarded as the arm's length 
price before other adjustments in respect of, for example, customs duties. 
Application 
The resale price margin of the reseller in the controlled transaction may be 
determined by reference to the resale price margin that the entity obtains on 
items purchased and sold in comparable uncontrolled transactions, as well as 
by reference to the resale price margin obtained by one independent party 
selling to another. 
Functional comparability is very important and it is essential that the functions 
performed by the independent entity are comparable to the functions 
performed by the member of the multinational selling to an independent 
enterprise. There should be no differences, which have a material effect on 
the price, for which reasonably accurate adjustments cannot be made. 
In applying the resale price method, fewer adjustments are normally required 
for product comparability than under the CUP method. Minor product 
differences are less likely to have an effect on profit margins than on prices, 
as profit margins for similar functions tend to be equal, but prices for different 
products will be equal only to the extent that products are substitutes for one 
another. For example, a distributor performs the same function to sell 
toasters and blenders and is therefore likely to require the same profit margin, 
but blenders are not comparable in price to toasters. 
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Although broader product differences can be allowed in the resale price 
method, product similarity may still be important when applying this method, 
for example when high value intangibles are involved. All the other factors 
affecting comparability will have to be considered when applying the resale 
price method. 
The resale price method focuses only on the external sale price to third 
parties and the gross margin required rewarding the function performed by the 
reseller. These factors are not overly sensitive to differences between the 
cost structure of a member of a multinational and an independent firm. Thus, 
if the member of the multinational operates a more efficient distributorship 
than the independent firm, this will result in a higher net profit percentage 
when the resale price method is used, and will not influence the gross profit 
percentage. 
The resale price method is most appropriate where the reseller does not add 
substantially to the value of the product or does not posses valuable 
marketing intangibles. 
Practical problems 
• The biggest problem is to determine an arm's length resale price gross 
margin. It is usually very difficult to find a transaction between 
independent enterprises that is similar to a controlled transaction and 
where differences do not have a material effect on the margin. 
• Accounting policies also play an important role and appropriate 
adjustments should be made to ensure that the same types of costs 
are included for the comparison. The items of cost taken into account 
to arrive at a gross margin may differ from company to company. 
• The application of this method sometimes requires access to 
segregated product data. 
76 
Whilst this information may be available in respect of the controlled 
party being examined, it will usually not be available in respect of 
uncontrolled entities used as benchmarks. 
Example 5 
A South African company, manufactures pasta at its factory in Cape Town. 
Subsidiaries in Italy and Greece distribute the pasta in their relevant markets 
after packaging the pasta. The packaging is not a very complicated process 
since the pasta is shipped from South Africa in units of 500g wrapped in 
plastic. These individual packets are merely packaged in cardboard boxes by 
the subsidiaries. 
Application of the resale price method: 
A search on independent comparable distributors showed that these 
independent distributors obtain a gross profit margin of 37 per cent to 40 per 
cent. The only difference is that these distributors are not involved in 
packaging the pasta. 
The effect of the additional packaging function on the gross profit margin 
earned by the subsidiaries should be evaluated. If material, an adjustment 
should be made. If not material, the subsidiaries would also be expected to 
earn a gross margin of between 37 per cent and 40 per cent. 
The Cost Plus method 
Description 
The cost plus method requires estimation of an arm's length consideration, by 
adding an appropriate mark-up to the costs incurred by the supplier of goods 
or services in a controlled transaction. This mark-up should provide for an 
appropriate profit to the supplier, in the light of the functions performed, assets 
used and risks assumed. 
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Application 
This method is best suited to situations where: 
(a) services are provided, 
(b) semi-finished goods are sold between connected parties, 
(c) connected persons have concluded joint facility agreements or long-
term buy-and-supply arrangements. 
The mark-up should ideally be determined with reference to the mark-up 
earned by the same supplier in uncontrolled transactions. If this is not 
possible, the mark-up should be determined by using the mark-up earned in 
comparable transactions by an independent supplier performing comparable 
functions, bearing similar risks and employing similar assets to those of the 
taxpayer. 
An uncontrolled transaction is comparable to a controlled transaction for 
purposes of the cost plus method if one of two conditions is met: 
(a) none of the differences between the transactions being compared or 
between the enterprises undertaking those transactions materially 
affect the cost plus mark up in the open market; or 
(b) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the 
material effects of such differences. 
Fewer adjustments are needed for product comparability than under the CUP 
and the same comparability principles as discussed under the resale price 
method will apply to the cost plus method. 
Practical problems 
(a) The application of the cost plus method presents certain difficulties. In 
particular, the determination of costs, as some companies is more 
effective than others and will incur lower costs. 
(b) In addition there may be circumstances where there is no discemable 
link between the level of costs incurred and a marked price. 
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(c) Accounting policies also play an important role and appropriate 
adjustments should be made to ensure that the same types of costs 
are included for the comparison. The types of cost included in cost to 
arrive at a gross margin may differ from company to company. 
(d) The application of this method sometimes requires access to 
segregated product data. Whilst this information may be available in 
respect of the controlled party being examined, it will usually not be 
available in respect of the uncontrolled entities used as benchmarks. 
Example 6 
B, a South African holding company, is responsible for the development of all 
the software and the purchase of computer hardware to be used by its 
subsidiaries in Namibia and Botswana. It was clear from the beginning that 
there was a market for this kind of service in Africa. B also provides this 
service to other customers throughout Africa. The software and hardware 
required by each customer are unique and differ from the software developed 
and hardware supplied to the subsidiaries, but the functions and processes to 
provide these services are comparable. 
Application of the cost plus method: 
An analysis of the income and costs in respect of the services provided to the 
independent customers indicates that costs are recovered and gross profit of 
between 22 per cent and 25 per cent is achieved. 
B should therefore charge its subsidiaries at cost plus between 22 per cent 
and 25 per cent for the performance of the information technology function. 
Transactional Net Margin method (TNMM) 
Description 
The TNMM examines the net profit margin that a taxpayer realises from a 
controlled transaction, relative to an appropriate base, for example cost, sales 
or assets. This ratio is referred to as a profit level indicator. 
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The profit level indicator of the tested party is compared to the profit level 
indicators) of comparable independent parties. 
Application 
Although the TNMM is classified as a transactional profit method, it is more 
closely aligned to the CP and RP methods than to the profit split method. As 
with the CP and RP methods, the TNMM focuses on the functions performed 
by an enterprise. The difference is that the TNMM compares net profit rather 
than gross profit. 
The TNMM is, however, considered less reliable than the traditional 
transaction methods. This is because the net margins which are used in the 
TNMM are very sensitive to the relative cost structures of the entities being 
compared, as they include operating expenses in their calculations. 
For example, if a multinational operates a more efficient distributorship than 
the independent firm, the application of the TNMM would result in a lower net 
profit being determined for the distributorship than if the RP method were 
used. Thus, unless an adjustment could be made to reflect the relative 
efficiency of the firms being compared, use of the TNMM would not provide a 
reliable result. 
In order to maximise the reliability of the TNMM, the member of the 
multinational and the independent firm being compared would need to be 
structurally similar. In practice, firms are structurally unique and comparisons 
of indicators between firms will tend to be less reliable than comparisons 
made at the gross margin level. For this reason the TNMM, along with the 
profit split method are considered to be methods of last resort in international 
practice. 
This observation does not preclude the TNMM from being used. It must be 
recognised that reliable information on gross margins may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain. Thus information constraints may dictate the TNMM as 
the only practical approach in many cases. 
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The connected party (tested party) whose profit level will be compared to the 
profit level of the independent parties will usually be the party for which 
reliable data on the most closely comparable transactions can be identified. It 
is also usually the enterprise that is the least complex and that does not own 
valuable intangible property. 
Practical problems 
(a) The net margin of a taxpayer can be affected by factors that do not 
necessarily have an influence on price or gross margins, thereby 
reducing the reliance that can be placed on the results in applying the 
TNMM. 
(b) Information about the taxpayer, required to apply the TNMM may not 
be available at the time of determining an arm's length price. It may, 
for example, not be possible to determine the net margin that will result 
from the controlled transaction. 
(c) Information on the uncontrolled transaction may not be available. 
(d) As with the CP and RP methods, the TNMM is a one-sided analysis, as 
it does not consider the effect of the determined price on the other 
party to the transaction. However, because operating expenses affect 
the calculations, the result for the TNMM is likely to be less reliable 
than that determined under the other methods. 
It is important, therefore, to check that the profit resulting from applying 
the TNMM is consistent with what one may expect, based on first 
principles. 
(e) It is often difficult to determine a transfer price once an appropriate 
margin has been determined. 
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Example 7 
CCP is a manufacturer of dehydrated food. Its products are distributed by 
subsidiaries throughout Europe. CCP does not sell to independent 
distributors at all and no comparables could be located that would allow the 
application of the CUP, cost plus or resale price methods. The profit split 
method is not applicable and the only remaining method is thus the TNMM. 
Research on comparable independent companies resulted in the 
determination of an arm's length range of 15 per cent to 18 per cent. This 
percentage is determined by expressing operating profit as a percentage of 
turn over. After adjustments were made for differences between CCP and the 
comparable independent companies, in respect of stock holding and debtors 
days outstanding, the range of arm's length margins is 17,5 per cent to 19 per 
cent. 
The transfer price for the sale of the dehydrated food from CCP to its 
subsidiaries should thus be set at a level that will result in operating profit as a 
percentage of turnovers of between 17.5 per cent and 19 per cent. 
The Profit Split method 
Description 
The first step in the profit split method is to identify the combined profit to be 
split between the connected parties in a controlled transaction. In general, 
combined operating profit is used, ensuring that both income and expenses of 
the multinational are attributed to the relevant connected person consistently. 
That profit is then split between the parties according to an economically valid 
basis approximating the division of profits that would have been anticipated 
and reflected in an agreement made at arm's length. 
Application 
The profit split method is usually applied where transaction are so interrelated 
that they cannot be evaluated separately. 
82 
Under similar circumstances, independent enterprises may decide to set up a 
form of partnership and agree to some form of profit split. 
Two alternative approaches to the profit split method are outlined in the 
OECD Guidelines. Under both approaches, the first step is to determine the 
combined profit attributable to the parties to the transaction. The combined 
profit is then allocated as follows: 
• Under the residual profit split approach, each of the parties to the 
transaction is assigned a portion of profit according to the basic 
functions that it performs. The residual profit or loss is then 
allocated between the parties on the basis of their relative economic 
contribution in respect of the amount to be allocated. 
• Under the contribution analysis approach, it is generally combined 
operating profit (profit before interest and tax) that is divided 
between the parties on the basis of the relative contribution of each 
party to that combined gross profit. 
However, the EOCD Guidelines notes that these approaches are not 
necessarily exhaustive or mutually exclusive. There may be alternative ways 
to split a profit to achieve a reliable arm's length result. 
As is explained in the OECD Guidelines it may, in some circumstances, be 
appropriate to split gross profits (as opposed to operating profits) between the 
connected parties and then deduct the operating expenses incurred by or 
attributable to each relevant enterprise. The example used in the OECD 
Guidelines is the case of a multinational that engages in highly integrated 
worldwide trading operations involving various types of property. It may be 
possible to determine the enterprises in which expenses are incurred or 
attributed, but not to accurately determine the particular trading activities to 
which those expenses relate. In such a case it may be appropriate to split the 
gross profit from each trading activity and then deduct from the resulting 
overall gross profit the operating expenses incurred by or attributable to each 
enterprise. 
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The allocation of gross profit should be consistent with the location of 
activities and risks. Care must be taken to ensure that the expenses incurred 
by or attributable to each enterprise are consistent with the activities 
performed and risks assume by the relevant entities. 
Residual Profit Split Analysis 
The residual profit split approach first provides both the parties to the 
transaction with a basic return, based on what independent firms would obtain 
for performing similar functions and undertaking similar risks. Applying other 
transfer pricing methods, such as a cost plus method or a resale price 
method, could also achieve this. 
The residual profit remaining after the first stage division would be allocated 
among the parties, in accordance with the way in which this residual would 
have been divided between independent enterprises. Facts and 
circumstances that could influence the profit allocation in the second stage 
include the parties' contributions of intangible property and relative bargaining 
positions. 
This requires a judgement about what factors contribute to the residual profit, 
and their relative contribution. For example, it may be determined that the 
process development and the marketing are the only relevant contributors to 
the residual profit and that each contributes 50 per cent to that profit. A 50:50 
split of the residual profit between the manufacturer and the retailer would 
then be justified. 
There is no definitive guide on how the relative contribution of the parties 
should be measured. It is quite likely that the transaction between the parties 
will be unique, so there will be no external benchmark against which to test 
the reliability of the assessment of relative contributions. In practice, the 
assessment of relative contribution may, of necessity, need to be a somewhat 
subjective measure, base on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
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Contribution analysis 
Multinationals are organisationally different from comparable domestic 
enterprises. Large integrated multinationals may have the benefit of cost 
savings attributable to the scale of their operations otherwise know as 
economies of scale. 
Such savings are not necessarily available to independent enterprises. For 
example, the administration costs incurred by a multinational which both 
manufactures and retails toasters are likely to be less than the aggregated 
costs faced by two separate firms, one of which manufactures toasters, and 
the other of which retails them. In the absence of intangibles, the price 
determined under the cost plus method would then be higher than the price 
determined under the resale price method. This means that there would be a 
negative residual if the residual profit split approach were to be used. 
Economies of scale are not an aspect which can readily be evaluated in a 
traditional arm's length analysis. However, it is an important factor that needs 
to be addressed when determining whether a multinational's transfer prices 
are consistent with the arm's length principle. 
One approach to this problem may be to use the contribution analysis 
approach. 
Under this approach, the combined gross profit of the two parties to a 
transaction is allocated between them, on the basis of their relative 
contribution to that profit. This differs from the residual profit split approach, in 
that basic returns are not allocated to each of the parties to the transaction 
before the profit split is made. 
Practical problems 
• The application of the profit split method relies on access to world-wide 
group data, which may be difficult to obtain. 
• The allocation of profits is subjective 
85 
• This method may result in less reliable measure of the arm's length 
price than an analysis under one of the other methods. 
Example 8 
A, a South African manufacturer of mining equipment, acquired B, a company 
located in Namibia. B has an established distribution network in Namibia and 
the rest of Africa and has good contacts at mines in the region. A would not 
have been able to sell its product without involving B's contacts. Before the 
acquisition of the B, A and the company considered entering into a joint 
venture agreement and were negotiating a profit split of 40 per cent for A and 
60 per cent for B. 
Application of the profit split method: 
There are not comparables which would allow the application of the CUP, 
resale price or cost plus methods. Based on the negotiations before the 
acquisition of B by A, it was decided to apply the profit split method to arrive at 
arm's length prices. Because of the importance of B's contacts and 
distribution network, and the other factors taken into account during the 
negotiation phase, it was decided that the transfer price at which the product 
should be sold to the B should be set at a level that will result in a 40:60 profit 
split if the relevant factors remain unchanged. 
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Chapter Seven 
7. Interest and Penalties 
Penalties 
The penalty, additional tax and offence provisions applicable in the event of 
default or omission in the completion of the tax return or evasion of taxation 
are contained in sections 75, 76 and 104 of the Act and will also apply to 
default, evasion or omission relating to transfer pricing. The Act does not 
impose specific penalties in respect of non-arm's length pricing practices. 
Interest 
Sections 89 bis and 89 quat of the Act provides for interest on the 
underpayment of tax and will also apply if the underpayment of tax results 
from non-compliance with sections 31 of the Act. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
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Chapter Eight 
8. Secondary Tax on Companies (STC) 
Sections 64C of the Act provides that certain amounts distributed to a 
recipient by a company are deemed to be a divided declared by the company, 
Section 64C(3)(e) deems any amount adjusted or disallowed in terms of 
section 31 to have been distributed to a recipient by the company. The 
adjustment will therefore be subject to STC. 
A "recipient" is defined as any: 
• Shareholder of the company; 
• Relative of such shareholder; or 
• Trust of which the shareholder or relative is a beneficiary. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
Chapter Nine 
9. Burden of Proof 
In terms of section 31, the discretion to adjust the consideration in respect of a 
transaction rests with the Commissioner. In the discharging of its burden of 
proof it is clearly in a taxpayer's best interests to: 
• Develop an appropriate transfer pricing policy; 
• Determine the arm's length amount, as required by section 31; and 
• Voluntarily produce documentation to evidence their analysis. 
Section 82 of the Act places the burden of proof regarding exemptions, non-
liability for tax, deductions or set-offs on the taxpayer. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
Chapter Ten 
10. Advance Pricing Agreements (APA's) 
APA's are described in detail in the OECD Guidelines. In short, this is a 
process whereby the setting of transfer prices in respect of controlled 
transactions may be agreed with tax administrators in advance of the 
transactions being undertaken and reported. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
Chapter Eleven 
11. Intangible Property 
Key Points 
• The process for applying the arm's length principle to intangible 
property is no different than for other property. It can be more 
problematic to apply, however, because: 
> Valid comparables can be difficult, if not impossible, to locate 
> For entirely commercial reasons, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) may structure their arrangements in different ways to 
independent firms. 
• Functional analysis is critical in determining the real nature of 
intangible property being transferred. The value of intangible 
property can be more sensitive to small differences than other 
property, so it is important that the nature of the transaction (and 
relevant pricing factors) be fully understood. 
• If one party to a transaction does not contribute intangible property, 
the most straightforward analysis is likely to involve using that party 
as the "tested party", even if it is outside New Zealand. 
• The value of intangible property is broadly based on perceptions of 
its profit potential. If there are no reliable comparables on which to 
apply the pricing methods directly, alternatives may be to: 
> Apply the profit split method, which requires a less rigorous 
application of comparables than do the other methods. 
> Value intangibles based on evaluations of profit potential. 
When dealing with marketing activities of firms that do not own the 
marketing intangible, it is important to ensure that their compensation is 
commensurate with what independent entities would have accepted given 
the rights and obligations under the arrangement. 
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Introduction 
'Paragraph 6.2 of the OECD guidelines provides a general description of 
intangible property: 
The term "intangible property" includes rights to use industrial assets such as patents, 
trademarks, trade names, designs or models. It also includes literary and artistic 
property rights, and intellectual property such as know-how and trade secrets. 
.. These intangibles are assets that may have considerable value even though they 
may have no book value in the company's balance sheet. There also may be 
considerable risks associated with them (e.g., contract or product liability and 
environmental damages). 
The OECD guidelines focus on trade and marketing intangibles (referred to 
collectively as commercial intangibles). The reason for distinguishing 
between these two types of intangibles is that they have different features that 
lead to the creation of their respective values. Understanding the distinction 
aids significantly in applying the arm's length principle correctly. 
The treatment of intangible property can be one of the most difficult areas to 
apply correctly in transfer pricing practice. Transactions involving intangible 
property are often difficult to evaluate for tax purposes, because: 
• It can be difficult to discern the precise nature of the transaction - the 
transaction may represent a number of components, tangible and 
intangible, bundled together to form a single product. 
• The property may have a special character complicating the search for 
comparables -this might make value difficult to determine at the time of 
the transaction, or to confirm subsequently as being arm's length. 
• MNEs may, for entirely commercial reasons, structure their 
transactions in ways that would not be adopted by independent firms. 
Source date accessed 17 September 
New Zealand Transfer Pricing 
Available from: http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz 
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A sound functional analysis is an important first step in applying the arm's 
length principle to intangible property. Functional analysis can help identify: 
• The factors that have led to the creation of intangible value, and 
consequently where one might expect the rewards to that intangible to 
accrue 
• Who the "owner" of the intangible is 
• What the true nature of the property being transferred is 
• The terms and conditions under which a related party is using an 
intangible (for example, whether the user is a licensee of the intangible, 
or merely a contract distributor). 
The results of the analysis can identify those features of a transaction for 
which comparables ideally should be identified. It also better enables a check 
that the price determined is consistent with the true nature of the property 
being transferred. (Table 2, which contains a list of specific factors that can 
be particularly relevant in determining the nature of intangible property being 
transferred, is a key reference in this chapter.) 
The most desirable way to determine the arm's length price is through the 
direct application of reliable comparables. For example, the arm's length 
price might be determined directly by reference to the transfer of similar 
intangible property in an uncontrolled transaction (a comparable uncontrolled 
price, or CUP), or by comparing the return to a manufacturing function 
incorporating equivalent intangible property (a cost plus approach). 
One possibility here is that if one of the parties to the transaction does 
not contribute any intangible property, that party might be used as the 
"tested party", even if it is not the New Zealand party to the transaction. 
Alternatively, internal comparables (the transfer of the same property to 
an independent third party), if available, could prove a valuable source 
of information 
The often unique nature of intangible property does mean, however, that 
applying comparables directly may not always be practicable. 
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Further, even if an apparent comparable can be located, it would be 
erroneous to assume it can usefully be applied mechanically. 
The key issue in section GD3 is whether the most reliable measure of the 
arm's length price has been determined, not whether a comparable has been 
identified and applied in a process. In some cases, it may be better that no 
comparable is applied, rather than applying a patently bad comparable. 
If comparables cannot be applied directly, recourse might be made to the 
profit split method, which requires a less rigorous application of comparables 
than the other methods. Alternatively, the intangible might be valued by 
reference to reliable projections of future cash flows attributable to that 
property. Comparables might still be usefully applied in such an approach, 
possibly, for example, as support for the variables underlying the valuation. 
One issue that taxpayers should be conscious of, and will need to address in 
their analysis, is the possibility that a double deduction might arise if a local 
operation, either directly or indirectly, is meeting the costs of maintaining 
intellectual property (generally an issue associated with marketing 
intangibles). If an independent party would not be required to maintain the 
intangible in a similar transaction, the local operation should not be paying the 
same price for the property being transferred as the independent firm, as well 
as meeting the maintenance expenditure. 
As with any other area of transfer pricing, the quality of a taxpayer's analysis 
and documentation will be a factor in supporting the credibility of its transfer 
prices. As discussed in the documentation chapter in the draft of Part 1 of the 
guidelines, taxpayers should weigh the cost of preparing documentation 
against the risk that Inland Revenue might make an adjustment in determining 
the extent to which documentation should be prepared for a transaction. In 
this regard, taxpayers might usefully consider whether an APA would 
represent a cost-effective way of obtaining greater certainty that their transfer 
prices will be acceptable to Inland Revenue. 
This chapter discusses first the identification of the nature of the intangible 
property being transferred. 
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It then considers ways in which the arm's length price for the transfer might be 
determined. Finally, it considers specifically the treatment of marketing 
intangibles. 
This chapter is based on the OECD guidelines, and cross-referenced to 
paragraphs in those guidelines when relevant. If further detail is required, 
reference should be made to those guidelines. 
Identifying types of intangible property 
The OECD guidelines begin their discussion of intangible property by 
distinguishing between two broad types of intangible property - marketing 
intangibles and trade intangibles (which are essentially non-marketing 
intangibles). An important reason for this distinction is that the two types of 
intangible property have different characteristics that give rise to the creation 
of their intangible value. An awareness of the distinction can be useful in 
identifying the factors contributing to an intangible's value, and aids 
significantly in applying the arm's length price correctly. 
For example, the effectiveness of the promotion of a trade name (a marketing 
intangible) is likely to b a significant factor in determining its value (although 
the quality of the underlying product or service will also be important). This 
suggests that an important factor in assessing the value of a marketing 
intangible used in a transaction will be how that intangible is maintained. For 
example, a marketing intangible may have a very limited life unless supported 
by current marketing expenditure (in other words, if current marketing is 
eliminated, its value will quickly evaporate). Such an intangible is likely to 
have little or no inherent value, and it would be inconsistent with the arm's 
length principle for the intangible to earn anything beyond a nominal return. 
The value of a trade intangible, by contrast, is more likely to be determined by 
the use to which it can be applied. It is the inherent quality in the intangible 
property that is dominant in creating its value. 
Table 6 summarizes the general differences between the two types of 
intangibles. 
Table 6: Distinguishing trade and marketing intangibles 
Trade intangibles 
1,Tend to arise from risky and costly 
research and development 
2. Generally associated with the 
production of goods. 
3. Use of a patented trade intangible 
may result in a monopoly for a 
product. 
4. Any legal rights established (for 
example, a patent) are likely to have 
a limited life. 
Marketing intangibles 
1. Often cheap to create legally (such as 
trademarks and trade names) but very 
costly to develop and maintain value. 
2. Associated with the promotion of 
goods or services 
3. Competitors are able to enter the 
same market if products are 
differentiated 
4. May have an indefinite life (if properly 
maintained). 
Consideration of these differences will be important in determining the nature 
of any intangible property that is applied in a transaction, and the type of 
comparables that might need to be identified to assess the value of that 
property. This it will be important in determining: 
• The value of any intangible property transferred within a MNE, and 
• The amount of income attributable to intangible property and how: 
o The income should be allocated between the parties if 
ownership of the property is shared. 
o One party to a transaction should be compensated if it 
contributes t the value of intangible property owned by the other 
party 
The focus, however, should be not so much the ability to correctly classify 
intangibles into trade and marketing intangibles (because the boundary may 
be blurred in many instances), but rather on developing an awareness of 
factors that lead to the creation of value in intangible property of different 
natures. 
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If the nature of the intangible property under consideration is better 
understood, so too will be the ability to ascertain effectively the appropriate 
arm's length price for its transfer. 
Applying arm's length principle 
In principle, the arm's length standard applies to intangible property in the 
same way as for any other type of property - the methods in section GD 13(7) 
are applied to determine the most reliable measure of the arm's length price. 
As noted in paragraph 408, however, the arm's length principle can be difficult 
to apply in practice to controlled transactions involving intangible property, 
because: 
• It can be difficult to discern the precise nature of the transaction - the 
transaction may represent a number of components, tangible and 
intangible, bundled together to form a single product. 
• The property may have a special character complicating the search for 
comparables - this might make value difficult to determine at the time 
of the transaction. 
• MNEs may, for entirely commercial reasons, structure their 
transactions in ways that would not be adopted by independent firms 
(paragraph 6.13, OECD guidelines). 
For example, a MNE might transfer property that an independent firm would 
not be prepared to transfer. It is common for MNEs to license technology to 
their subsidiaries because they retain control over how that technology is 
exploited. An independent firm, by contrast, may be more reluctant to license 
its technology, out of concern that the other party might use or disclose the 
detail of the property inappropriately. 
When attempting to apply comparables to transfer pricing analysis involving 
intangible property, a key consideration is how reliable those comparables are 
in practice. 
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Because of the special character of intangible property, it is possible that even 
apparently small differences between two items bin compared could have a 
significant effect on their relative value. Consequently, a greater level of care 
is likely to be required in assessing comparability when intangible property is 
involved. It cannot be automatically assumed that because two items of 
intangible property appear comparable outwardly, they are directly 
comparable. Detailed analysis will often be necessary to determine the extent 
to which the two items are truly comparable. 
It is also important to consider both parties to the transaction (paragraph 6.14, 
OECD guidelines). One might, for example, perform an analysis that 
demonstrates, from a transferor's perspective, the price at which an 
independent party would be prepared to transfer property. However, this may 
not be the same price that an independent party would be prepared to pay, 
based on the value and usefulness of the intangible in its business. At arm's 
length, the transaction would not proceed at the price determined from the 
transferor's perspective. That price could not, therefore, be an arm's length 
price. 
Ascertaining what the transaction involves 
Before appraising whether the price for intangible property is arm's length, it is 
necessary to ascertain exactly what the transaction involves. This identifies 
what it is that will need to be priced, ideally by reference to independent 
comparables. For example, a transaction may involve the transfer of a bundle 
of rights in a way that is not representative of how independent firms might 
have undertaken a similar transaction. Segmenting the transfer into its 
component parts may give a clearer picture of exactly what is being 
transferred. It might also permit reliable comparables to be more readily 
identified for each component part, rather than requiring comparables to be 
located for the transaction as a whole. 
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A central tool for ascertaining what the transaction involves will be a functional 
analysis. Failure to perform an adequate functional analysis has the potential 
to cause much controversy and confusion over inter-company transfer pricing 
for intangible property. In the absence of an adequate analysis, it is likely 
there will be no meeting of the minds between taxpayers and Inland Revenue 
on what the transaction involves, let alone how it should be priced. 
Functional analysis can be used to answer three threshold questions for 
appraising intangible property: 
• Who is the "owner" of the intangible property for transfer pricing 
purposes? 
• What is the true nature of the intangible property being transferred? 
• What are the terms and conditions under which a related party is using 
an intangible? For example, is the user a licensee of the intangible, or 
merely a contract distributor? 
The answer to the first question is relevant in identifying where returns to the 
intangible might be expected to accrue. The answers to the second and third 
questions identify factors that' will be relevant in actually pricing the transfer of 
the intangible. 
Ownership of intangible property 
A general rule of thumb is that intangible property is owned initially by the 
party that bears the expenses and risks associated with its development, 
whether incurred directly or indirectly through recompensing another entity 
undertaking work on its behalf. The owner of that property is then entitled to 
all of the income attributable to that intangible. The principle behind this is 
that, at arm's length, an independent party would not be prepared to incur 
such expenditure and assume such risk if it were not going to benefit from 
what is produced by its efforts. 
The initial owner of an intangible may choose to transfer some or all of the 
rights to exploit the intangible. 
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However, an arm's length charge should be imposed for the transfer of those 
rights. The party to whom the rights are transferred will then be entitled to the 
income attributable to the intangible rights that are transferred. 
It is possible; however, that legal ownership of intangible property (such as a 
patent) does not vest with the party that has developed the property. In that 
case, the arm's length principle would treat the legal owner as being entitled 
to the income attributable to that intangible, even though the legal owner has 
not contributed to its development. However, the developer of the intangible 
property would be expected to have received an arm's length consideration 
for its development services. This might, for example, take the form of: 
• a cost reimbursement (with an appropriate profit element), if the 
developer is a contract developer (effectively a service provider), or 
• lump-sum compensation, if the developer bore all of the expenses and 
risks of development. 
Whether or not the developer is a contract developer should be determined on 
the facts of the relationship between the parties during the development 
process. If the developer is a contract developer, it would seem reasonable to 
expect that at the outset of the development process, an arrangement would 
be in place for costs to be reimbursed during the process or a formal 
understanding already established that the developer will not own any 
intangible property produced. 
Factors in pricing 
An understanding of the exact nature of the intangible property being 
transferred is fundamental to the correct evaluation of the arm's length price 
for that property. 
There are two aims in identifying the nature of the intangible property being 
transferred. 
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First, the key features of the intangible property that have led to the creation 
of its value are identified, giving an "indication of the important factors that will 
need to be priced. This helps identify what it is that will give rise to the 
expected benefits, and to differentiate profit attributable to that intangible from 
the profit attributable to other factors, such as functions performed and other 
assets employed. 
Second, if the intangible property is to be valued by reference to comparables, 
and it must be acknowledged that in many cases, this may not readily be 
possible, it will enable the true extent of comparability between the 
transactions being compared to be better ascertained. 
The OECD guidelines (paragraphs 6.20 to 6.24) and the United States section 
482 regulations (1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2)) identify a number of specific factors 
that may be particularly relevant to consider in determining the nature of 
intangible property being transferred. Table 7 lists the more significant of 
these factors (but is not an exhaustive list). 
U96566 
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Table 2: Factors in determining nature of intangible property 
(a) The expected benefits from the intangible property, determined possibly 
through a net present value calculation. 
(b) The terms of the transfer, including the exploitation rights granted in the 
intangible, the exclusive or non-exclusive character of any rights granted 
any restrictions on use, or any limitations on the geographic area in which 
the rights might be exploited. 
(c) The stage of development of the intangible in the market in which the 
intangible is to be exploited, including, where appropriate: 
the extent of any capital investment, start-up expenses or development work 
required, and 
necessary governmental approvals, authorizations, or licenses required. 
(d) Rights to receive updates, revisions, or modifications of the intangible. 
(e) The uniqueness of the property and the period for which it remains 
unique, including the degree and duration of protection afforded to the 
property under the laws of the relevant countries, and the value that the 
process in which the property is used contributes to the final product. 
(f) The duration of the license, contract, or other agreement, and any 
termination or negotiation rights. 
(g) Any economic and product liability risks to be assumed by the 
transferee. 
(h) The existence and extent of any collateral transactions or on-going 
business relationship between the transferee and transferor, 
(i) The functions to be performed by the transferee, including any ancillary 
or subsidiary services 
Each of the factors in the table will influence the price for the intangible 
property. For example, if the transferee is to assume economic and product 
liability risks (paragraph g), the arm's length price for the property transferred 
will be lower (perhaps by way of a lower royalty rate) than if the transferor 
retained those risks. 
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Terms and conditions of transfer 
The conditions for transferring intangible property may be those of an outright 
sale of the intangible or, perhaps more commonly, a licensing arrangement for 
rights in respect of the intangible property (paragraph 6.16, OECD guidelines). 
This identifies those aspects of the transaction for which a price needs to be 
determined. It also identifies the type of comparables that need to be 
identified if the arrangement is to be benchmarked against an uncontrolled 
transaction. 
Determining the conditions of the transfer will not necessarily be a 
straightforward task. For example, it may be difficult to differentiate between 
a transfer of an intangible, and the supply of a product or service that benefit 
from the intangible. 
One area of potential confusion is the treatment of embedded intangibles-for 
example, tangible property carrying rights to use a trade name or trade mark, 
which is sold by a manufacturer to a related distributor. 
There are a number of issues to be considered when dealing with the transfer 
of tangible property that includes an intangible element such as a trademark. 
First, it must be considered whether intangible rights have actually been 
transferred. For example, the mere acquisition of branded goods will in many 
cases not involve the transfer of intangible rights. 
Second, if it is considered that an intangible right has been transferred then 
consideration must be given to whether that right should be valued separately 
from the tangible property. This will be a question of fact and will depend on 
the available comparable data and available transfer pricing methods. In 
addition, a consideration of the industry specific factors might also be made. 
For example, in some industries the mere fact that an intangible right has 
been transferred with the tangible property may not give rise to a valuable 
right, such as when the intangible element has no value. 
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In such a case, there would be no reason to attempt to separate the arm's 
length value of the tangible property from the intangible property. 
Calculating arm's length price 
Several issues arise when calculating the arm's length price for intangible 
property. 
First, in applying the traditional transactional methods (CUP, resale price and 
cost plus methods) or the comparable profits methods (including the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM)) to determine the arm's length price 
for a transaction involving intangible property, it will be very important to 
identify that the independent transaction used as a benchmark is truly 
comparable. If the independent transaction is not comparable, perhaps 
because an important functional difference has not correctly been identified, 
the analysis based on that comparable is likely to have no value. 
Second, in many cases, taxpayers will face difficulties in identifying reliable 
comparables on which to base a sound transfer pricing analysis. Taxpayers 
may then need to examine alternative approaches for performing an analysis. 
One option available to taxpayers is the use of the profit split method. A key 
feature of the profit split method is that it requires a less rigorous application 
of comparables than is required for analysis under the other methods. The 
downside of this, however, is that because the method tends to be more 
subjective in application than the other methods, it can increase the potential 
for disagreement between taxpayers and Inland Revenue over what transfer 
prices are appropriate. 
As an alternative, recourse might be made to a valuation-based approach to 
determining the arm's length price. As paragraph 6.29 of the OECD 
guidelines notes, in relation to transactions when valuation is highly uncertain 
at the time of the transfer: 
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One possibility is to use anticipated benefits (taking into account all relevant 
economic factors) as a means for establishing the pricing at the outset of the 
transaction. 
It is likely that comparables might still play a part in a valuation-based 
approach. For example, comparables might be located to lend support to the 
assumptions underlying the valuation model applied. The use of comparables 
is not essential to this approach, but would be expected to increase the 
credibility of the analysis, if applied. Valuation-based approaches are 
discussed further in paragraphs 471 to 492. 
Comparability 
It will be very important to identify that the independent transaction used as a 
benchmark is truly comparable when considering transactions involving 
intangible property. If the independent transaction is not comparable, perhaps 
because an important functional difference has not been correctly identified, 
the analysis based on that comparable is likely to have no value. 
The OECD guidelines, at paragraph 6.25, contain a detailed example 
illustrating various considerations in determining comparability for controlled 
transactions. The example contemplates how the arm's length price for a 
branded athletic shoe might be determined. 
The first approach suggested is to value the shoe, including its brand value, 
by reference to a comparable uncontrolled price. This might be done if there 
is a similar athletic shoe, both in terms of the quality and specification of the 
shoe itself and also in terms of the consumer acceptability and other 
characteristics of the brand name in that market, transferred under a different 
brand name in an uncontrolled transaction. 
The second approach involves estimating the value of the brand name itself, 
with the price of the unbranded shoe and the extra value attributable to the 
brand name being determined separately. 
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The OECD guidelines, at paragraph 6.25, suggest the following as one 
approach that might be taken: 
Branded athletic shoe 'A' may be comparable to an unbranded shoe in all 
respects (after adjustments) except for the brand name itself. In such a case, 
the premium attributable to the brand might be determined by comparing an 
unbranded shoe with different features, transferred in an uncontrolled 
transaction, to its branded equivalent, also transferred in an uncontrolled 
transaction. Then it may be possible to use this information as an aid in 
determining the price of branded shoe 'A', although adjustments may be 
necessary for the effect of the difference in features on the value of the brand. 
Paragraph 6.25 does conclude, however, by noting that: 
...adjustments may be particularly difficult where a trademarked product has a 
dominant market position such that the generic product is in essence trading 
in a different market, particularly where sophisticated products are involved. 
Example 9, adapted from the United States' section 482 regulations (1.482-
4(c) (4), example 4), further illustrates considerations in identifying intangibles. 
Example 9 
A German pharmaceutical company has developed a new drug that is useful 
for treating migraine headaches and produces no significant side effects. The 
new drug replaces an older drug that the company had previously produced 
and marketed as a treatment for migraine headaches. 
A number of drugs for treating migraine headaches are already on the market. 
However, because all of these other drugs have side effects, the new drug 
can be expected quickly to dominate the worldwide market for such 
treatments and to command a premium price. Thus the new drug can be 
expected to earn extraordinary profits. 
The German company had previously marketed its drug through an 
independent company in New Zealand. 
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It now decides to establish a New Zealand subsidiary, and assign that 
subsidiary the rights to produce and market the new drug in New Zealand. 
The question arises as to what might be an appropriate royalty rate to charge 
for those rights. 
On further research, it is determined that the old and new drugs were licensed 
at the same stage in their development and the agreements conveyed 
identical rights to the licensees. There has also been no change in the New 
Zealand market for migraine headache treatments since the earlier drug was 
introduced. Prima facie, therefore, it might be concluded that the license 
agreement for the new drug might be closely comparable to the previous 
license agreement with the independent company, allowing the previous 
agreement to be used as a CUP. 
Given the nature of the new drug, however, it is clear that its profitability is 
likely to be higher, and that the reward for that additional profitability should lie 
with its developer. This consideration would need to be factored into the 
license agreement for the new drug. 
Profit split method 
Taxpayers will, in many cases, face difficulties in identifying reliable 
comparables on which to base a sound transfer pricing analysis. The profit 
split method might then be a useful alternative approach for performing an 
analysis, particularly as it requires a less rigorous application of comparables 
than is required for analysis under the other methods. 
Paragraph 6.26 of the OECD guidelines similarly states that: 
In cases involving highly valuable intangible property, it may be difficult to find 
comparable uncontrolled transactions. It therefore may be difficult to apply 
the traditional transactional methods and the transactional net margin 
method, particularly where both parties to the transaction own valuable 
intangible property or unique assets used in the transaction that distinguish 
the transaction from those of potential competitors. 
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In such cases the profit split method may be relevant although there may be 
practical problems in its application. 
Inland Revenue acknowledges that comparable uncontrolled transactions 
may be particularly difficult to locate for New Zealand, given the size of our 
market and the nature of adjustments that might be required if overseas data 
is applied. In the absence of reliable comparable transactions, Inland 
Revenue considers the profit split method could represent a useful tool. If the 
method is to be used for more significant transactions, however, it may be 
prudent for taxpayers to consider whether there would be sufficient merit to 
seeking an APA. 
Application of the profit split method requires that profit be allocated based on 
the relative contribution of each party to a transaction. Although this 
allocation ideally should be made by reference to how independent firms have 
allocated profits in similar transactions, it may not be essential to apply 
comparables in practice, particularly if locating comparables will not be a 
practicable exercise. 
In such cases, profits will need to be allocated based on a subjective 
assessment of the relative contribution of each of the parties to the 
transaction. There is, however, no prescriptive way in which this judgment 
should be exercised, and each case will need to be assessed on its own facts 
and circumstances. In allocating profits, taxpayers should aim to determine 
compensation for each party that is consistent with each party's functions, 
assets used and risks assumed in relation to the transaction (to put it another 
way, an appropriate allocation based on a sound functional analysis). 
Second, in many cases, taxpayers will face difficulties in identifying reliable 
comparables on which to base a sound transfer pricing analysis. Taxpayers 
may then need to examine alternative approaches for performing an analysis. 
An important caveat should be noted in applying the profit split method. 
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The subjective nature of the profit allocation between the parties means that 
the method might reasonably be considered the least reliable of the transfer 
pricing methods. Because of this, the method is perhaps less likely to be, or 
may not be, acceptable in foreign jurisdictions, particularly if a more reliable 
alternative method can be applied. This has the potential to result in double 
taxation. 
A further consideration is that the profit split method is predicated on an 
adequate level of information being available about the related party. 
Consequently, a taxpayer seeking to rely on the profit split method will need to 
ensure that appropriate information on the offshore party or parties can be 
made available if requested by Inland Revenue. 
Valuation-based approach to intangible property 
The traditionally perceived role of comparables in analyses involving 
intangible property is that the comparables should be applied to support a 
transfer price for intangible property directly. For example, a CUP might be 
used to support the actual royalty rate adopted, or the cost plus method might 
be used to value a manufacturing function incorporating a production (trade) 
intangible. 
In the absence of reliable comparables on which to base this more traditional 
analysis however, recourse might be made to determining an arm's length 
price for the transfer of intangible property on a valuation-based approach. 
Such analyses are based on realistic projections of future benefits (paragraph 
6.29, OECD guidelines) attributable to the intangible. In lay terms, it is the 
question, "how much extra value does the intangible create?" 
Paragraph 6.29 of the OECD guidelines is drafted with specific reference to 
intangible property for which valuation is highly uncertain at the time of 
transfer. 
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Inland Revenue considers that the specific difficulties created by the size of 
the New Zealand market means that the approach could usefully have 
broader application here than a superficial reading of the OECD guidelines 
might imply, particularly for determining arm's length royalty rates. Taxpayers 
should be aware, however, that while Inland Revenue considers a broader 
ambit fully consistent with the tenor of the OECD guidelines, other tax 
administrations might not hold the same view. 
Applying a valuation-based approach 
As a broad principle, the value of an item of intangible property is based on 
perceptions of its profit potential. More formally, this might be determined by 
calculating the net present value (NPV) of the expected benefits to be realized 
(potential profits or cost savings) through the exploitation of that property. 
Example 10 illustrates this principle, and offers valuable insights into how: 
• an arm's length price for a transfer of intangible property might 
legitimately be estimated in the absence of reliable comparables; or 
• comparables might be applied in a non-traditional manner to support 
the assumptions underlying a valuation approach to intangible 
property. 
Example 10 
A New Zealand company is to be provided with intangible property that is 
expected to increase sales by $1 million for each of the next three years, but 
have no effect on sales beyond that time. Costs for those years will remain 
constant, except for an initial outlay of $500,000 to update machinery to utilize 
the property. There will be some risk to the company, and the risk-adjusted 
cost of capital is determined to be 20% (in practice, this would need to be 
based on commercial considerations). 
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The net present value of the cash flows for the intangible are calculated as 
follows: 
Year Cash flow Discount rate 




onal receipts 1,000,000 0.800 
onal receipts 1,000,000 0.640 






NPV (r = 20%): $ 1,452,000 
Based on this calculation, the New Zealand company might be prepared to 
pay a royalty of up to $743,852 for each year (that royalty rate also having a 
NPV of $1,452,000). If it paid such a royalty, the company would still earn its 
required rate of return from the project: 
Year Cash flow 
0 Initial outlay (500,000) 
1 Receipts less royalty 256,148 
2 Receipts less royalty 256,148 
3 Receipts less royalty 256,148 










= 20%): &_ 0 
Observations on valuation approach 
A couple of important principles for applying the arm's length principle can be 
derived from considering the difficulties in making such NPV calculations in 
practice. 
First, determination of the values for most of the variables applied in the NPV 
calculation (in particular, expected benefits and the appropriate discount rate) 
can be very subjective. Further, the arm's length principle does not appear to 
apply NPV calculations directly. 
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However, in appraising how independent firms have valued intangible 
property, the arm's length principle is implicitly testing what the market has 
established the variables in the NPV (or similar) calculation should be. 
Consider, for example, a CUP that is being used to determine an arm's length 
price for the transfer of intangible property. In negotiating their price, the 
independent firms would each have evaluated the profit potential of the 
intangible property. Although these evaluations may not have used formal 
NPV calculations, it is to be expected that they would at least have been 
based on some views of what the likely future income attributable to the 
intangible property would be, and the costs and risks involved in its 
exploitation. If a CUP is being used, therefore, the projections made by the 
uncontrolled participants in the market are implicitly forming the basis for 
establishing the transfer price in the controlled transaction. 
Second, it is important to consider both parties to the transaction (paragraph 
6.14, OECD guidelines). Example 10 determined the maximum value the 
transferee would be prepared to pay for the intangible property-the price 
commensurate with the value and usefulness of the intangible property in its 
business, given its risk-tolerance preference. At arm's length, however, the 
transferor is unlikely to have access to the same information as the 
transferee, and may for example, based on its own perceptions of profit 
potential, be prepared to license the intangible property for a royalty of only 
$500,000 per year. The parties might then be expected to negotiate a royalty 
somewhere between these two reservation prices. 
In principle, therefore, it should be possible to appraise intangible property 
without reference to comparables, and in the absence of reliable comparables 
or where only a limited amount of revenue is at issue, this may be the prudent 
approach for a taxpayer to take. Several cautions should, however, be noted. 
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First, ideally, transfer prices will be benchmarked against comparable 
transactions between independent firms, because this allows the reliability of 
assumptions made in performing NPV (or similar) calculations to be tested 
against a more objective base. The absence of one or more reliable 
comparables may reduce the credibility of the analysis. 
Second, although Inland Revenue considers a valuation-based approach can 
be undertaken to fall broadly within the acceptable transfer pricing methods, 
this view may not be respected by other tax administrations. Double taxation 
may then result. Taxpayers should, therefore, exercise caution in adopting 
such an approach if the resulting analysis is also to be provided to justify the 
transfer price to an overseas tax administration. 
Finally, the analysis in this section does not exhaust the theoretical 
underpinnings of valuation-based approaches. For example, it does not deal 
nicely with relatively immaterial transactions (because the size of the 
transaction is small relative to the overall size of operations), when cost of 
capital considerations may become unimportant in determining whether a 
transaction proceeds at a given price. If a valuation-based approach is to be 
adopted, particularly for larger value transactions, greater consideration will 
need to be given to the theoretical underpinnings of valuation techniques. 
At arm's length, the value of intangible property is often ascertained from 
perceptions of its profit potential. This approach may also be feasible in many 
transfer pricing cases. The value of comparables is then found in the support 
they give to values adopted in that calculation, such as appropriate discount 
rates and whether independent firms would have been prepared to rely on the 
projections made in entering into the transaction on the terms agreed. 
Applying comparables in this manner is not essential, but is likely to add to the 
credibility of the analysis. 
For more complex or high-valued transactions, it may be prudent for 
taxpayers to consider the merits of seeking an APA. 
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Valuation highly uncertain at time of transaction 
The OECD guidelines, at paragraphs 6.28 to 6.35, discuss the application of 
the arm's length principle to transfers of intangible property when valuation of 
that property is highly uncertain when it is transferred. One important issue in 
the discussion is whether tax administrations should be able to review the 
transfer price adopted by reference to a form of the arrangement that differs 
from that adopted by the taxpayer. 
When the value of the intangible property is uncertain, the risks and rewards 
of transferring that property will typically be shared between the parties when 
it is transferred. A MNE might structure a transaction in a number of ways, 
depending on the level of risk, and the various types of risk, each of its 
members are to assume. For example, the initial owner of intangible property 
may choose to exploit that property with the following levels of market risk 
(paragraphs 6.29 to 6.31, OECD guidelines): 
• No risk: The developer sells the entire results of its development for a 
fixed sum, with the purchaser then assuming the entire risk of the 
commercial success or failure of the intangible. 
• Complete risk: The developer might manufacture and market the final 
product itself, using a contract distributor to get the product to the 
market. 
• Partial risk: The developer might retain ownership, but license the use 
of that property to another entity in return for some form of royalty. 
Such an arrangement results in risk being shared between the 
developer (the licensor) and the other party (the licensee). The 
developer's royalty return depends on the level of sales by the other 
entity, and is subject, therefore, to market risk. The other entity's return 
will similarly be dependent on how well the product performs in the 
market. Royalties with periodic adjustments are a subset of this 
category. 
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Given that the structure of the arrangement can be seen to be a way of 
sharing market, credit, country and other risks between the parties, the form 
of the transaction is not usually the most important aspect for transfer pricing 
purposes. Rather, the central issue in any audit activity should generally be 
whether the allocation of rewards, including the royalty rate set in a taxpayer's 
arrangements, is consistent with the level of all the risks assumed by the 
taxpayer. This examination needs to be set in the context of the functional 
analysis for each party's actions. As with third party dealings, consideration 
should also be given to the circumstances of other dealings between the 
parties, and each party's overall level of risk. An appropriate allocation of risk 
and reward would be determined by reference to what independent parties 
would have done in similar circumstances. 
In evaluating a taxpayer's transfer price, Inland Revenue will need to 
benchmark its analysis against an objective external standard. If the form of a 
taxpayer's arrangement is unique, therefore, Inland Revenue might, in 
evaluating the transfer price adopted, need to look to: 
the arrangements that would have been made in comparable circumstances 
by independent enterprises... Thus, if independent enterprises would have 
fixed the pricing based on a particular projection, the same approach should 
be used... in evaluating the pricing. ... [Inland Revenue] could, for example, 
enquire into whether the associated enterprises made adequate projections, 
taking into account all the developments that were reasonably foreseeable, 
without using hindsight (paragraph 6.32, OECD guidelines). 
As with other transfer pricing issues, taxpayers are in the best position to 
ensure there are no surprises in the way Inland Revenue reviews their 
transfer prices. This can be achieved by documenting, in as much detail as 
prudent, why a transaction has been structured in the way it has, and how the 
components of that price have been determined by reference to what 
independent parties in similar circumstances would have done. 
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Further, the more thorough a taxpayer's analysis, the less likely it will be that 
the Commissioner will be able to meet the burden of proof required if the 
taxpayer's determination of the arm's length price is to be overturned. 
Taxpayers should consider costs, risks and benefits in determining the extent 
to which they should develop and document their policy; as indicated in the 
previously published draft chapter on documentation. 
Use of standard international royalty rate 
One question that is often posed is whether a royalty rate established as 
arm's length in relation to one member of a MNE will be accepted 
automatically by Inland Revenue as also being arm's length in relation to New 
Zealand. This issue is discussed in the example 11. 
Example 11 
A United States company licenses technology to a number of subsidiaries 
around the world. A comprehensive analysis has been performed to support 
that an arm's length royalty rate for its Japanese subsidiary is 7%. On the 
basis of this analysis, the company also charges the same royalty rate to all of 
its other subsidiaries. The question arises as to whether Inland Revenue will 
accept 7% as an arm's length royalty rate for the New Zealand subsidiary. 
There are two issues in this question. First, there is the question of whether 
7% is actually an arm's length royalty rate for the Japanese subsidiary. 
Second, if it is an arm's length rate for Japan, are the economic features of 
the New Zealand and Japanese markets sufficiently similar that the same 
royalty rate should be expected to apply in both markets? 
(a) 7% is an arm's length royalty for Japan 
Even if 7% is an arm's length royalty rate for Japan, it is still necessary to 
examine the relative economics of the New Zealand and Japanese markets to 
test whether 7% is also appropriate for New Zealand. 
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If the differences between the markets were relatively small, 7% would be an 
appropriate royalty rate for New Zealand. However, if significant differences 
exist, adjustments could be made to reflect these if they can be valued. 
At arm's length, both the licensor and licensee will look at profit potential from 
intangible property in negotiating a royalty rate. If markets are different, 
potential profits from those markets are also likely to differ, and so too would 
acceptable royalty rates. 
(b) Arm's length royalty for Japan is not 7% 
From an alternative perspective, even if 7% is not an arm's length royalty rate 
for the Japanese subsidiary, it may still be an arm's length rate for the New 
Zealand subsidiary. For example, it might be determined that an arm's length 
royalty rate for Japan is only 5%, but that a 2% premium is justified by the 
geographical differences between Japan and New Zealand. 
Significantly, even though incorrect analysis might have been used to 
ascertain the 7% royalty rate for New Zealand, the important thing is that a 
correct royalty rate has been determined. There would, therefore, be no 
justification for Inland Revenue to attempt to substitute an alternative royalty 
rate under section GD 13. 
Marketing activities of enterprises not owning marketing intangible 
Marketing activities are often undertaken by enterprises that do not own the 
trademarks or trade names they promote. The question is how the marketer 
should be compensated for those services. Two key issues arise: 
• Should the marketer be compensated as a service provider or might it 
be entitled to a share in any additional return attributable to the 
marketing intangibles? 
• How should the return attributable to marketing intangibles be 
identified? 
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Whether the marketer is entitled to a return on the marketing intangibles 
above a normal return on marketing activities will depend on the obligations 
and rights implied by the agreement between the parties (paragraph 6.37, 
OECD guidelines) -in other words, what compensation would an independent 
party have sought given its rights and obligations under the agreement. The 
OECD guidelines contain a couple of illustrative examples: 
• A distributor acting merely as agent and being reimbursed for its 
promotional expenditure would be entitled to compensation appropriate 
to its agency activity, but not to any share in returns attributable to 
marketing intangibles (paragraph 6.37). 
• A distributor bearing the cost of its own marketing activity would expect 
to share in the potential benefits of those activities (paragraph 6.38). 
However, it is important to consider the rights of the distributor in 
determining whether any extra return is justified. For example: 
The distributor may benefit directly from its investment in developing the value 
of a trademark from its turnover and market share if it has a long-term sole 
distribution contract for the trademarked product. 
Unless a distributor bears expenditure beyond that which an independent 
distributor with similar rights would bear, there is no justification for it to 
receive an additional margin relative to an independent distributor. 
A further factor to consider, not explicitly addressed above, is the extent to 
which the distributor is bearing real risk, relative to independent firms in the 
market. If a controlled distributor were bearing relatively greater risk than 
comparable independent firms, it would, prima facie, also be expected to 
derive a greater margin from its activities. 
Example 12, adapted from examples 2 & 3 of the United States section 482 
regulations at 1.482-4(f) (3) (iv), illustrates these principles further. 
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Example 12 
Gizmo Co owns all of the worldwide rights for a name. The name is widely 
known outside New Zealand, but is not known within New Zealand. Gizmo Co 
decides to enter the New Zealand market and establishes a subsidiary here, 
to distribute in New Zealand and to undertake the advertising and other 
marketing efforts required to establish the name in the New Zealand market. 
The New Zealand subsidiary incurs expenses in developing the New Zealand 
market that are not reimbursed by Gizmo Co. However, the level of these 
expenses are comparable to those incurred by independent firms in the same 
industry when introducing a product in the New Zealand market under a brand 
name owned by a foreign manufacturer. 
Because the subsidiary would have been expected to incur the development 
expenses if it were unrelated to Gizmo Co, no adjustment needs to be made 
in respect of the marketing expenses. 
The situation would be different, however, if the subsidiary incurred expenses 
that are significantly larger than would independent firms under similar 
circumstances. Expenses incurred in excess of the level incurred by 
independent firms should be treated as a service to Gizmo Co, as they 
effectively represent a service adding to the value of Gizmo Co's intangible 
property. 
There is a caveat to this conclusion. The analysis does not contemplate 
whether the price for the product being transferred is arm's length. If, for 
example, the New Zealand subsidiary were undercharged for the product it 
receives, this would compensate for its excessive expenses. When both the 
transfer price for the product and the expenses are considered together, it 
may be determined that there is no overall transfer pricing issue. This 
observation also illustrates that it may often not be appropriate to stop with an 
analysis at the gross level. 
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From Gizmo Go's perspective, charging inadequate consideration would 
reduce its gross margin relative to comparable firms. However, this is offset 
by the New Zealand subsidiary not charging explicitly for its services, which 
reduces the costs Gizmo Co would recognize in calculating its net profit. 
Allocating return attributable to marketing intangibles 
Identifying the return attributable to marketing activities if it is to be allocated 
between the parties to a transaction is not straightforward (paragraph 6.39, 
OECD guidelines). The OECD guidelines identify several difficult questions 
that must be considered in identifying the amount of any return: 
• To what extent have advertising and marketing activities contributed to 
the production or revenue from a product? 
• What value, if any, did a trademark have when introduced into a new 
market -it is possible that its value in a particular market is wholly 
attributable to its promotion in that market. 
• Does a higher return for a trademarked product relative to other 
products in the market trace back to the marketing of the product, its 
superior characteristics relative to other products, or a mixture of both? 
Little guidance can be given on how these questions should be evaluated, 
and each case will need to be determined based on its own facts and 
circumstances. However, as with the general application of the arm's length 
principle, taxpayers should aim to determine transfer prices that result in the 
compensation a distributor receives for its marketing activity being consistent 




This chapter has considered the following key points: 
• Intangible property poses some special difficulties in determining the 
arm's length price, particularly because of the complexity of some 
arrangements and the difficulties in identifying comparable 
transactions. 
• If one party to a transaction does not contribute intangible property, the 
most straightforward analysis is likely to involve using that party as the 
"tested party", even if it is outside New Zealand. 
• Two particular areas where sufficient care is often not taken are: 
A local operation is meeting costs for maintaining intellectual property that an 
independent party would not be required to meet, while at the same time 
paying the same amount as the independent firm for property it acquires (a 
double deduction). 
Analysis being based on what outwardly appears to be reliable comparables 
but that is not reliable, because the nature of intangible property (potentially 
high price variations for differences that superficially appear quite small) has 
not been considered adequately. 
• In many cases (particularly using the profit split method), the analysis 
of intangible property may need to be based on a subjective judgment 
with limited recourse to reliable comparables. In exercising such 
judgment, taxpayers will need to be conscious that the final result 
should seek to ensure that each party to the transaction obtains a 
return that is broadly consistent with its functions performed, assets 
employed and risks assumed in relation to the transaction involving the 
intangible property. 
• Valuing intangible property based on realistic projections of future 
benefits may be an appropriate response to the limited availability of 
comparables in the New Zealand market, particularly in relation to 
determining arm's length royalty rates. 
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• When dealing with marketing activities of firms that do not own the 
marketing intangible, it is important to ensure that their compensation is 
commensurate with what independent entities would have accepted 
given the rights and obligations under the arrangement. 
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Chapter Twelve 
12. Intra-group Services 
Key Points 
• The OECD guidelines identify two key issues in the treatment of intra-
group services: 
Has a service been provided? 
If so, how should the arm's length price be determined? 
• The central test of whether an intra-group service is provided is 
whether the recipient of an activity receives something that an 
independent enterprise in comparable circumstances would have been 
prepared to pay for or perform for itself in-house. 
• The arm's length price can be determined using either: 
a direct charge approach, when charges are identified for specific 
services, or 
an indirect charge approach, when costs are indirectly allocated 
against all services provided in determining a cost base on which 
charges are to be determined. 
• The costs attributable to a particular service will often not be able to be 
discerned directly, meaning that an indirect cost allocation will need to 
be applied: 
An appropriate allocation key will need to be used, based on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. 
The key focus is a realistic allocation, not accounting perfection -Inland 
Revenue is looking for a fair charge for the services provided and a 
reasonable effort into establishing a basis for future calculations. 
Source accessed 17 September 
New Zealand Transfer Pricing Explored 
Available from: http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz 
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Introduction 
Essentially, this chapter summarizes the material in the OECD guidelines. 
For greater detail, recourse should be made to those guidelines. 
This chapter does, however, discuss issues that will be of particular interest to 
Inland Revenue in administering the transfer pricing rules. The discussion 
includes, for example, an analysis of possible allocation keys that might be 
applied in determining the cost base if the cost plus method is to be applied to 
determine the arm's length price. 
Inland Revenue expects that cost allocations will be commonly employed in 
determining an arm's length price for services. This being the case, however, 
it is important not to lose sight of the big picture. Inland Revenue is looking for 
a realistic allocation of costs (with due regard to considerations of materiality), 
not accounting perfection. Ultimately, the test is whether a fair charge is 
determined for services provided to a related company from the perspective of 
both the provider and the recipient. Inland Revenue would also expect to see 
that taxpayers have put a reasonable effort into establishing a framework from 
which the price for future services can be readily determined. 
Key issues in intra-group services 
The OECD guidelines, in paragraph 7.5, identify two key questions in applying 
the arm's length principle to intra-group services: 
• Has an intra-group service in fact been provided? 
• If so, what charge for that service is consistent with the arm's length 
principle? 
Has a service been provided? 
Each case must be tested on its own facts and circumstances (paragraph 7.7, 
OECD guidelines). 
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However, as a general rule, the central issue in determining whether an intra-
group service has been provided will be whether the recipient of an activity 
receives something that an independent firm in comparable circumstances 
would have been willing to pay for, or would have performed in-house for 
itself, If the activity is not one for which the independent enterprise would 
have been willing to pay or perform for itself, the activity is not one for which 
the independent enterprise would have been willing to pay or perform for 
itself, the activity ordinarily should not be considered as an intra-group service 
under the arm's length principle (paragraph 7.6, OECD guidelines). 
The OECD guidelines contain several examples that illustrate this principle: 
• If a service is performed to meet an identified need of one or more 
specific members of the group, an intra-group service would ordinarily 
be found to exist, because an independent party would be willing to 
pay to have that need met (paragraph 7.8). 
• "Shareholder activities" performed because of an ownership interest in 
a group member (such as meetings of the shareholders of the parent 
company of the group) would not justify a charge to the recipient 
company, because the group members do not need the activity 
(paragraph 7.9) 
• An incidental benefit derived by a group member from an activity 
performed for another group member does not mean that it has 
received a service, because independent enterprises would not be 
willing to pay for the activities giving rise to the benefit (paragraph 
7.12). 
• An "on call" service may be an intra-group service to the extent that it 
would be reasonable to expect an independent enterprise in 
comparable circumstances to incur 'standby' charges to ensure the 
availability of the service when the need for them arises (paragraph 
7.16). 
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The OECD guidelines also confirm that the provision of centralized services 
by a parent company or a group service centre and made available to some 
or all members of the group will ordinarily be treated as intra-group services. 
Paragraph 7.14 contains an illustrative list of a number of centralized services 
that are likely to be intra-group services because independent enterprises 
would be willing to pay for or perform them themselves: 
• Administrative services: 
planning, co-ordination, budgetary control, financial advice, accounting, 
auditing, legal, factoring, computer services. 
• Financial service: 
supervision of cash flows and solvency, capital increases, loan 
contracts, management of interest and exchange rate risks, and 
refinancing. 
• Assistance in the fields of production, purchasing, distribution and 
marketing 
• Services in staff matters such as recruitment and training. 
• Research and development or administration and protection of 
intangible property for all or part of the MNE group. 
Central test for intra-group service: Does the recipient of an activity 
receive something that an independent enterprise in comparable 
circumstances would have been prepared to pay for or perform for itself 
in-house? If so, that activity will ordinarily be treated as an intra-group 
service. 
Determining the arm's length charge 
Once it has been determined that a service has been provided, the issue is to 
determine what would constitute an arm's length charge. As with other 
transactions, the arm's length charge is one that is consistent with what would 
have been charged and accepted in a transaction between independent 
enterprises in comparable circumstances. 
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The OECD guidelines identify two general approaches to determining arm's 
length prices for intra-group services. Which approach is followed will tend to 
depend on whether each service provided and its recipient is identified 
separately, or whether the services are more generic in nature and their 
recipients not specifically identified. 
The direct-charge approach can be applied when a member of the group is 
charged for specific services. In principle, it should be a relatively 
straightforward exercise to determine the arm's length price for that service, 
either by reference to the charge for that service when provided to 
independent third parties (an internal CUP) or by reference to charges made 
for comparable services between independent firms. 
The indirect-charge approach may be applied if the direct-charge approach is 
impractical, or if arrangements within the group are not readily identifiable and 
either incorporated into the charge for other transfers, allocated among group 
members on some basis, or in some cases not allocated among group 
members at all (paragraph 7.22, OECD guidelines). In such cases, cost 
allocation and apportionment approaches, often with some degree of 
estimation or approximation, may need to be used (paragraph 7.23, OECD 
guidelines). 
Examples in the OECD guidelines of when the indirect-charge approach may 
be applicable include: 
• The proportion of the value of the services rendered to various 
members of a group cannot be quantified except on an approximate 
basis (for example, central sales promotion activities). 
• Separate recording and analysis of the relevant service activity for 
each beneficiary would involve a burden of administrative work 
disproportionate to the activities themselves (paragraph 7.24). 
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If a specific service forms part of the provider's main business activity and is 
provided both to members of the group and to third parties, the direct-charge 
approach generally should be applied as a matter of course (paragraph 7.23, 
OECD guidelines). The method by which the services provided to third 
parties are priced should also be able to be applied to services provided 
within the group. 
Applying a pricing method 
In applying the arm's length principle to intra-group services, it is necessary to 
consider both the provider and the recipient of the service. The price charged 
for the service should not be more than an independent recipient in similar 
circumstances would be willing to pay (a test of benefits received). Similarly, 
an independent supplier would not be prepared to offer the service below a 
certain price. Costs incurred by the service provider will be a relevant 
consideration in determining what this reservation price is (paragraph 7.29, 
OECD guidelines). 
In practice, the CUP and cost plus methods tend to be most widely used in 
determining arm's length prices for intra-group services. However, there is no 
reason why other methods should not be used if they result in the 
determination of an arm's length price. 
The CUP method is likely to be used if there is a comparable service provided 
between independent enterprises in the recipient's market, or the service is 
also provided to independent parties under similar circumstances to which it is 
provided to another group member (paragraph 7.31, OECD guidelines). 
However, care would need to be taken to ensure that necessary adjustments 
are made to reflect differences in comparability. 
For example, there may be overheads borne by an independent firm that a 
MNE may not need to incur, such as promotional activities to obtain new and 
retain existing clients, the costs of obtaining professional indemnities, and any 
other differences in the functions performed by the MNE and the comparable 
firm. Such differences would require adjustments in determining an arm's 
length charge for the MNE. 
The cost plus method is widely used because, in many cases, the difficulty of 
identifying market prices and the general objectivity with which costs can be 
identified and measured make it the most practicable and reliable method to 
apply. The costs associated with the provision of a service are first identified 
(a discussion on how costs might be determined indirectly is set out below). 
Reference is then made to services provided by independent firms in 
comparable circumstances to determine what, if any, mark-up would be 
added at arm's length. 
When applying the cost plus method, it is important to ensure that the 
functions for which a margin is being determined are comparable. If the MNE 
provides only an agency function, it would not be appropriate to use the mark-
up added by an independent distributor as an unadjusted comparable. 
Having said that, the reliability of the cost allocation is likely, in practice, to be 
a more material issue than the reliability of the mark-up adopted 
Profit element 
In an arm's length transaction, an independent enterprise would normally seek 
to earn a profit from providing services, rather than merely charging them out 
at cost. However, there may be circumstances when services would be 
provided without a profit element. 
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The OECD guidelines give the following examples: 
• The costs of providing the service are greater than an independent 
recipient would be prepared to pay, but the service complements 
the provider's activities in a way that increases its overall profitability 
(for example, providing the service generates goodwill) (paragraph 
7.33). 
• For whatever reason, an incidental service is provided in-house 
when it could have been sourced more cheaply from an 
independent party (a CUP). In this case, the CUP would be the 
arm's length price, rather than a price based on the costs incurred 
by the service provider (paragraph 7.34). 
Thus it will not always be the case that the arm's length price will reflect a 
profit for the service provider (paragraph 7.33, OECD guidelines). 
Determining cost base for cost-plus method 
Paragraph 7.23 of the OECD guidelines notes that: 
Any indirect-charge method should be sensitive to the commercial features of 
the individual case (e.g.. the allocation key makes sense under the 
circumstances), contains safeguards against manipulation and follow sound 
accounting principles, and be capable of producing charges or allocations of 
costs that are commensurate with the actual or reasonably expected benefits 
to the recipient of the service. 
There are a number of allocation keys that might be applied to allocate costs 
between members of a group. The OECD guidelines, for example, make 
reference to allocation keys based on turnover, staff employed, and capital 
applied (paragraph 7.25). The following discussion, which moves beyond the 
material in the OECD guidelines, considers the strengths and weaknesses of 
various allocation keys that might be applied. Whether one of the keys, in the 
form discussed below or in an adapted form, might be appropriate will depend 
on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
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In performing cost allocations, it is important not to lose sight of the big 
picture, Inland Revenue is looking for a realistic allocation of costs, not 
accounting perfection. Taxpayers should be seeking to determine a fair 
charge for services provided to a subsidiary, and at the same time, making a 
reasonable effort to establish a coherent basis for determining the price for 
future services. 
It is also important that taxpayers perform any cost allocation with regard to 
the services are being provided. The question is what costs are being 
incurred to provide a service. Care must, therefore, be taken to exclude costs 
that do not relate to the services under consideration. 
If taxpayers are in any doubt over an appropriate cost allocation, they may 
find it useful to discuss the allocation they propose with their account manager 
in Inland Revenue. 
While any advice would not be binding on Inland Revenue, it may give 
taxpayers a useful insight into how Inland Revenue may approach the issue. 
If more certainty is required, taxpayers could consider applying for an APA. 
Global formula approach 
One approach is to apportion costs on the arbitrary basis of gross turnover of 
the worldwide group as follows: 
New Zealand gross sales x Costs to be allocated 
Worldwide group's gross sales 
The global formula approach does not always arrive at a reasonable or 
realistic result. Deficiencies in the approach include the inappropriate 
allocation across all subsidiaries of: 
• Start-up costs of new subsidiaries. 
• Costs relating to specific functions performed for, or product lines 
carried by, only certain members of the group. 
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• Charges for services available to the group but not taken advantage 
of by all of its members. 
Another issue to be aware of concerns the level of costs associated with 
certain activities, For example, a MNE may derive its income from a number 
of sources, such as product sales, providing services and leasing assets. 
However, the ratio of income to expenditure may not be uniform across all 
these income types, with some types of income having higher valued inputs 
per dollar of output. 
It may, therefore, be appropriate to associate the income and expenditure with 
the relevant functions. Then, once the specific functions of the New Zealand 
enterprise have been identified, the costs relating to functions that the New 
Zealand enterprise performs could be allocated as follows: 
Gross New Zealand turnover for relevant functions x Net central expenditure on 
Gross worldwide turnover for relevant functions relevant functions 
When dealing with the service industry, it is common to talk in units of time 
expended to perform a task. When a central service provider performs 
functions for the group as a whole, therefore, it may be appropriate to allocate 
costs based on the amount of time expended on providing services to each 
member of the group. 
If services are provided that have varying degrees of value (for example, the 
provision of both specialist technical assistance and general clerical 
activities), an allocation based only on time spent may not be appropriate. 
Instead, the costs should be determined for each category of service provided 
by the central service provider. Costs associated with each category might 
then be allocated between members of the group based on time spent 
providing those services. 
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It should be noted that the purpose of dividing costs between categories of 
service is to ascertain an allocation of costs between members of the group 
that better reflects the benefits they derive. In undertaking this division, 
however, taxpayers should not attempt to over-refine their service 
categorization. In many cases, the gains in accuracy from further refining the 
service categorization will not be sufficient to justify the additional cost of 
performing the further analysis. Inland Revenue would, however, expect 
taxpayers to record the basis for any cut-off decision. 
If a group is not completely service oriented, the costs of the service provider 
will need to be divided to identify those expenses associated with the service 
industry. 
Income producing units 
Corporations in the business of leasing plant and equipment are generally 
able to identify the generation of income from the utilization of specific units. 
Expenditure incurred in producing the income can also be more readily 
identified. Once it is determined what assets the New Zealand operation is 
leasing out, as compared to the leasing of assets by the worldwide group, 
centralized costs might be allocated based on the number of units being 
utilized. This principle is illustrated in example 13. 
Example 13 
A New Zealand shipping company charters ships that it owns. In allocating 
head office costs incurred by a foreign parent, it is likely to be appropriate to 
make an allocation of head office costs relating to chartered vessels over the 
number of chartered vessels worldwide. However, it is not likely to be 
appropriate to allocate head office charges of the group's entire shipping 
operations over the number of ships operated and leased. This type of 
allocation does not recognize that different types of ships have different costs 
-for example, support vessels for oil exploration and production platforms as 
contrasted with roll-on roll-off freighters. 
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If only support vessels are present in New Zealand it is appropriate only to 
identify the world costs applicable to support vessels. It is also necessary to 
distinguish between those vessels leased fully manned and bareboat 
charters. 
Once the relevant costs have been identified, they could be allocated as 
follows: 
Support vessels in New Zealand x Allocation expenditure 
Support vessels worldwide whether working or not 
Gross profit allocation basis 
There will be situations where allocating costs on the basis of gross revenue 
will not be appropriate. This may be through an inability to make like 
comparison of the turnover of the various members of a group, because the 
mix of activities is not consistent throughout the group and some activities 
may require greater support than others. For example, one member's gross 
turnover may be distorted by a high turnover activity, conducted only by that 
member, that generates little, if any, profit and requires relatively less 
assistance to administer (for example, a lease that is sub-leased or a contract 
that is sub-contracted). 
In this situation, it may be worthwhile exploring the possibility of allocating 
costs on the basis of relative gross profits instead. Income from non-active 
business sources would need to be excluded. Whether this approach is 
appropriate will depend on the circumstances of the case and whether it 
results in a fair allocation. 
Other methods 
There are various other keys that might be employed to allocate central 
expenditure. These include, for example, units produced, material used, and 
number of employees. 
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However, as with any other key, use of alternative keys would need to provide 
a cost allocation that is consistent with the benefit derived by the New 
Zealand entity. 
Pitfalls and potential audit issues 
One obvious issue for taxpayers is what needs to be done to minimize the 
likelihood that Inland Revenue will attempt to adjust taxpayers' transfer prices. 
Provided taxpayers adopt transfer pricing that is consistent with the principles 
expressed earlier in the chapter, they should have few difficulties. 
There are, however, certain areas where audit experience indicates mistakes 
are commonly made: 
• Charges are made for services that do not meet the test of whether 
an intra-group service has been provided, such as the charging by 
a parent of shareholder activities. 
• Errors are made in determining the cost base when the cost-plus 
method is applied, such as the use of a cost allocation key that is 
inappropriate for a taxpayer's circumstances. 
• Taxpayers have taken a double deduction, for example, by 
including a service fee implicitly in a license fee while charging 
separately in allocating group service centre costs (paragraph 7.26, 
OECD guidelines). 
Taxpayers should be conscious of these issues in determining their transfer 
prices. 
Administrative practice for services 
As a general rule, Inland Revenue does not endorse the use of safe harbours. 
This is because they can result in prices being determined that are clearly 
inconsistent with the arm's length principle but are consistent with the safe 
harbour. 
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One example is the previously mentioned incidental service provided in-house 
where the costs alone of providing the service exceed a CUP for the service. 
Inland Revenue is conscious, however, of the desirability of minimizing 
compliance costs, particularly if this can be achieved without compromising 
the integrity of the arm's length principle. To this end, Inland Revenue will, 
with the exception of the level of the de minimis threshold, be following the 
administrative practice of the Australian Tax Office for services (Australian 
Tax Office Ruling TR 99/1 refers). It should be noted, however, that 
taxpayers are not obliged to follow the administrative practice. They can, if 
they prefer, follow the normal application of the arm's length principle in 
determining their transfer pricing for services. 
The administrative practice applies to: 
• Non-core services. These services refer to activities that are not 
integral to the profit-earning or economically significant activities of 
the group. They include activities that are supportive of the group's 
main business and are generally routine but are not similar to 
activities by which the group derives its income; and 
• Services with costs below a de minimis threshold. This will apply 
when the total direct and indirect costs of supplying services to New 
Zealand or foreign associated enterprises, as appropriate, is not 
more than $100,000 in a year. The practice applies to all intra-
group services supplied or acquired where the relevant cost limit is 
not exceeded. 
It is considered that the use of transfer prices permitted by the administrative 
practice will give rise to a realistic price that still approximate arm's length 
pricing. 
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The criteria for the administrative practices are set out in Table 3. 
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To accommodate the varying requirements of other jurisdictions and lessen 
the possibility of double taxation, taxpayers may instead use the following 
alternative prices for non-core services in the preparation of their tax returns, 
if relying on the Commissioner's application of the administrative practice. 
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A transfer price of up to cost plus 10% of relevant costs would be accepted for 
non-core services supplied by associated enterprises resident in a particular 
foreign country where it is established by the taxpayer's group that it is the 
practice of that country to require that price for the services for its tax 
purposes, and to accept such prices (or mark-ups) for similar services 
supplied by New Zealand companies to associated enterprises resident in that 
country (i.e. that the other country does or would be expected to accept 
symmetrical mark-ups for such services). Therefore, the New Zealand group 
may use different prices in respect of services acquired from associated 
enterprises in different countries, but none that exceed cost plus 10% of 
relevant costs. 
Similarly, a transfer price not less than cost plus 5% of relevant costs but less 
than cost plus 7.5% of relevant costs would be accepted for non-core services 
supplied to associated enterprises resident in a particular foreign country 
where it is established by the taxpayer's group that it is the practice of that 
country to require, for its tax purposes, that the price for the services be no 
higher than the selected price, and to accept such prices (or mark-ups) as an 
upper limit for similar services supplied by an associated enterprise in that 
country to New Zealand companies. In other words, the other country does or 
would be expected to accept symmetrical mark-ups for such services. Again, 
the New Zealand company group might use different transfer prices for 
services supplied to associated enterprises in different countries, but none 
less than cost plus 5% of relevant costs. 
All companies in the group must use the same mark-up on costs for services 
supplied to, or acquired from, associated enterprises in the same country, if 
they are relying on the administrative practice. 
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Caveat to administrative practice 
The administrative practice does not absolve taxpayers from the requirement 
to establish that a service (i.e., a benefit) has actually been supplied. If no 
service has been supplied, then no charge would be made at arm's length. 
The administrative practice does not override this. 
To rely on the administrative practices, the taxpayer (whether a supplier or 
recipient of services) must maintain documentation to establish the nature and 
extent of services supplied/acquired and to address the issues (as far as is 
relevant) considered in calculating the relevant total costs. If the taxpayer 
wishes to use a mark-up other than 7.5% documentation of other countries' 
practices to support that choice should be kept. Further, a record of the 
relevant group companies should be retained. 
Practical solutions 
Determining arm's length prices must remain a practicable exercise. The aim 
of the exercise is to determine practically an arm's length price, rather than 
attempting to over-refine the analysis, which at the end of the day, may not 
actually result in a more reliable measure of the arm's length price being 
determined. 
The OECD guidelines themselves note that while an attempt should be made 
to establish the' proper arm's length pricing, there may be practical reasons 
why a tax administration, exceptionally, might forgo accuracy in favour of 
practicability (paragraph 7.37). As indicated in the chapter on documentation, 
taxpayers should trade-off the risks and benefits in determining its transfer 




This chapter has considered the following key points: 
• There are two central questions to be addressed: 
Has a service been provided? 
If so, how should the arm's length price be determined? 
• The central test of whether a service has been provided is whether 
the recipient of an activity receives something that an independent 
enterprise in comparable circumstances would have been prepared 
to: 
> pay for it, or 
> perform the service for itself in-house. 
• The most common methods applied to services are the CUP and 
cost plus methods. 
• When the cost plus method is applied, costs might be identified 
directly if a direct-charge approach is used, or indirectly using an 
appropriate allocation key. 
• If a cost allocation is being used, taxpayers should seek to identify a 
realistic allocation of costs with due regard to considerations of 
materiality, and not for accounting perfection-the real test is whether 
a fair charge is determined for the services provided. 
• In auditing the transfer prices adopted for intra-group services, 
Inland Revenue is most likely to focus on: 
> whether a service has been provided 
> if an indirect-charge approach is taken to applying the cost 
plus method, whether the allocation key used is appropriate, 
and 
> whether the approach adopted results in a double deduction 
through both an explicit and an implicit charge being made. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
13. Cost Contribution Arrangements 
Chapter VIII of the OECD Guidelines deals specifically with cost contribution 
arrangements. The Commissioner considers the guidance provided in that 
chapter relevant and recommends that taxpayers follow the guidance in 
establishing arm's length conditions in international agreements with 
connected persons involving cost contribution arrangements. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 
Date: 6 August 1999 Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act) 
Chapter Fourteen 
14. Effective Date 
The provisions of section 31 apply only to goods and services supplied on or 
after 19 July 1995. The Practice Note applies in respect of such goods or 
services. 
Source date accessed 11 July 2004 
South African Revenue Services Practice Note No. 7 




Taxpayers should make conscientious efforts to establish transfer prices that 
comply with the arm's length principle and prepare documentation to evidence 
that compliance. 
Where such steps have been taken the Commissioner is likely to determine 
prima facie that the taxpayers' transfer pricing practices represent a lower tax 
risk and that the possibility of an in depth review of those practices is likely to 
be diminished accordingly. In contrast, taxpayers who give inadequate 
consideration to their transfer pricing practices are likely to receive greater 
scrutiny from the Commissioner. 
The following is a summary of the broad guidelines suggested: 
• Establish economic justification before the transaction is entered into; 
• Be satisfied that the consideration is an arm's length consideration; 
• Prepare and retain contemporaneous documentation to support the 
above matters and the assessment of market conditions at the time 
when the pricing decisions were made; 
• Justify the choice of method; and 
• Establish and consistently follow a systematic process for setting arm's 
length international transfer prices. 
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